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Paul Richard Goodchild, Ph.D. 
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I examine the effect of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition on financial 
statement users’ accuracy and criterion in detecting misstated accounts in a quarterly earnings 
release. I employ Signal Detection Theory, which allows the contemporaneous measurement of a 
participant’s accuracy and criterion in assessing an account as misstated or not misstated. I find 
that participants in the earnings-increasing condition were more accurate in detecting misstated 
accounts than participants in the earnings-decreasing condition. I did not find differences in 
accuracy of detecting misstated accounts between media-format conditions (video versus text) or 
disclosure-tone conditions (aggressive versus conservative).  
In addition, I find that participants in the video media-format condition were less confident in 
their decision-making versus participants in the text media-format condition. On average, 
participants who viewed the video earnings-release rated their confidence in the extreme 
intervals less frequently than participants in the text earnings-release condition. I did not find 
differences in participants’ criterion for reporting an account misstated between disclosure-tone 
conditions or earnings conditions. My results suggest that the effect of a misstatement on 
earnings affects participants’ accuracy, but not their criterion, while the presentation of the 
earnings release affects participants’ criterion, but not accuracy in detecting misstated accounts. 
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The Effect of Media Format, Disclosure Tone, and Earnings Condition on the Detection of 
Misstatements 
1. Introduction 
Analysts of financial statements make difficult, often risky decisions in a complex and 
uncertain environment, and financial disclosure practices are changing the way financial 
information is acquired, analyzed, and utilized. For example, as part of a decision to invest in a 
company, financial statement users may review financial information in a video, in a text 
document online, or some combination of digital or text media from a firm’s website. Financial 
statement users may attempt to detect misstatements in an effort to assess the quality of the firm. 
The detection of misstatements is difficult because misstatements can be obscured by factors, 
such as media format, disclosure tone (aggressive/conservative language used in the disclosure), 
and/or earnings condition (the effect of a misstatement on earnings).1 Factors that obscure true 
account balances are likely to decrease participants’ detection of misstatements, which may lead 
to lower decision-making quality.  
In this study, I examine whether media format, disclosure tone, earnings condition, and their 
interactions affect financial statement users’ decision-making quality. I use an experimental 
design, which relies on the detection of seeded misstatements as a proxy for decision-making 
quality. I argue that misstatement detection is important to users financial information, because 
misstatements often lead to future restatements, which can trigger a series of negative events 
                                                          
1 The factors investigated are not the only factors that may affect the detection of misstatements; however, 
alternative factors are not the focus of this investigation. Where theory suggests alternative factors may affect 
financial statement users’ decision-making, these factors are discussed and/or included as covariates in tests 
presented in Sections 5 and 6. 
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such as loss of investment/debt value, loss of retirement funding, or loss of employment (Elliott, 
Hodge, and Sedor, 2012) (hereinafter EHS). I employ Signal Detection Theory (e.g., Sprinkle 
and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005) to determine participants’ accuracy and criterion2 in 
detecting misstatements, a “signal” amongst balances that are not misstated, “noise” (the non-
signal condition). 
I focus on the effect of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition on the detection 
of misstated accounts for three reasons. First, video is an emerging media format for accounting 
disclosure (Clements and Wolfe, 1997, 2000; EHS, 2012), presents information in a multi-
sensory format, and requires increased cognitive effort to process versus text (e.g., Chaiken and 
Eagly, 1983; Sparks, Areni, and Cox, 1998; Chen, Duckworth, and Chaiken, 1999) and the use 
of video to report financial information is increasing (EHS, 2012). Second, management controls 
the content of financial disclosure, and disclosure tone affects financial statement users’ 
judgments (Henry, 2008). Finally, misstatements present investment risk, and the firm’s stock 
price generally declines when the restatement is announced (GAO, 2006). For these reasons, 
understanding the effect of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition on the 
detection of misstatements is an important step in the evolution of research on financial reporting 
and financial statement users’ decision-making.  
Video media format is multi-sensory and, relative to textual media, increases cognitive effort 
and the use of simple decision-making shortcuts to process information. Video is likely to attract 
and hold attention and excite the imagination (Short, Williams, and Christie, 1976; Appiah, 
2006). Studies find vivid stimuli in communication of information increase cognitive load and 
                                                          
2 Confidence in judgment can be derived from the response bias measure (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005) 
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the use of simple mental shortcuts to form judgments (e.g., Chaiken and Eagly, 1983; Sparks et 
al., 1998; Chen et al., 1999). Further, research examining the effect of video on financial 
statement user decision-making finds results consistent with increased reliance on shortcuts and 
information that is not relevant to the investment decision, such as communicator characteristics 
and entertainment of the communication (Clements and Wolfe, 1997; Clements, 1999; Clements 
and Wolfe, 2000; EHS, 2012). An increased reliance on heuristics has been shown to result in 
suboptimal investment (Lucey and Dowling, 2005) and managerial decisions (Rode, 1997). 
Typically, disclosure has a positive tone; however, in practice there is variation in disclosure 
tone. My study defines disclosure tone as, “the language used to describe managements’ 
communication of firm performance (aggressive or conservative) in disclosure, absent intent to 
mislead financial statement users.” Managers engage in managing financial statement users’ 
impressions and it affects financial statement user decision-making (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 
2007).3 I utilize aggressive and conservative-tones based on prior research documenting that the 
tone of disclosure or conference calls is incrementally useful to the financial information in 
financial analysis decision-making (Matsumoto, Pronk, Roelofsen, 2011; Mayew and 
Venkatachalam, 2012; Price, Doran, and Peterson, 2012) and the market reacts to disclosure tone 
after controlling for actual financial results (Henry, 2008).  
Craig, Garrott, and Amernic (2001) hypothesize that disclosures (particularly those on the 
Internet) are designed to affect users’ perception of and emphasis on information rather than 
focusing users on the content with the disclosure. Media format has been shown to interact with 
disclosure tone, increasing the effect of disclosure tone on financial statement users’ judgments 
                                                          
3 I acknowledge the possibility that management could obscure bad news by distracting financial statement users 
with video-induced stimuli; however, that is not investigated in my dissertation. 
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(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Mercer (2004) suggests financial statement users’ perception 
in the believability of a particular disclosure is based on an assessment of management’s motives 
and credibility, which she reports are characteristics that are more enduring than disclosure 
credibility. Her results are supported by the findings in Hirst, Koonce, and Miller, (1999) and 
Henry (2008) who state, “The directness with which earnings releases are communicated to 
financial statement users makes the potential influence of their tone and stylistic attributes … 
particularly relevant” (page 375). 
Misstatements are common and present an important risk to financial statement users. During 
the period from 2007 to 2012 there were, on average, 870 restatements filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC) per year (Audit Analytics, 2013). Approximately 
62% of the restatements affected earnings, with a disproportionate number, 82%, decreasing 
earnings. Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) examine the effect of restatements and find 
that magnitude, earnings direction, and the number of balances restated affect financial statement 
users’ judgments. A recent study examining financial statement users’ response to disclosed 
prior-period waived misstatements under Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 108, finds that 
firms experienced negative abnormal returns when the misstatement reported had increased 
earnings (Omer, Shelly, and Thompson, 2012). Restatements announced in 2002 to 2005, 
resulted in an average loss in market value of approximately $12 billion per year, after 
adjustment for market movements (GAO, 2006).  
Financial reporting is evolving and the use of video to report financial information is 
projected to continue increasing (EHS, 2012). As of 2013, many video financial reports did not 
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present new information, but were a “redisclosure”4 of previously reported financial information; 
however, in 2013 Netflix, Inc. and Yahoo! Inc. disclosed earnings in live video webcasts. The 
increase in video to report earnings on live video webcasts demonstrates the importance of 
investigating the effect of media format on the decision-making of users of financial information.  
I manipulate media format (video versus text), disclosure tone (aggressive versus 
conservative), and earnings condition (earnings-increasing versus -decreasing misstatements) to 
examine the effect of these factors on financial statement users’ decision-making. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two earnings conditions and one of four earnings release 
media-format conditions. Participants assume the role of investment analyst for ECT Electronics, 
Inc. and are instructed to examine Sound Systems Co.’s Q2 2013 financial statements, to assess 
account balances as misstated or not misstated, to provide a confidence level for their 
misstatement decision (seven-point Likert scale), and to estimate the percentage the account is 
misstated. See Appendices A through D for the experimental quarterly financial statements and 
Appendices E through L for experimental documents.  
I employ Signal Detection Theory (hereinafter SDT) methods and measures because they 
allow the contemporaneous calculation of accuracy and participants’ criterion when examining 
diagnostic tasks. SDT classifies participants’ decisions into four possible outcomes: hit, miss, 
correct rejection, and false alarm. Traditional non-SDT methods of accuracy, such as percentage 
correct, are inadequate because they do not separate accuracy from participants’ criterion 
(Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). This is particularly important in my 
                                                          
4 I am grateful to William Kinney, Jr. for coining the word “redisclosure” to describe video financial reporting that 
presents information previously disclosed in other media formats during a workshop with Ph.D. students. 
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experimental task, as media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition are likely to 
differentially affect participants’ accuracy and/or criterion to report a balance as misstated.  
I predicted participants in the video media-format condition would be influenced by cues that 
are not relevant to detecting misstatements in the video earnings-release, causing an increase in 
cognitive effort and, as a result, be less accurate detecting misstated accounts than participants in 
the text media-format condition. I did not find a difference in accuracy of misstatement detection 
between media-format conditions. Specifically, participants who viewed the video earnings 
release were not more or less accurate in detecting misstatements than participants who viewed a 
text earnings release. As a result, I cannot conclude that media format differentially affects the 
detection of misstated accounts. 
I predicted participants in the aggressive disclosure-tone condition to perceive the disclosure 
as serving management’s best interests, causing participants to acquire, analyze, and utilize 
relevant information; and, as a result, be more accurate than participants in the conservative 
disclosure-tone condition in detecting misstated accounts. I find that participants in the 
aggressive disclosure-tone condition were marginally statistically more accurate in detecting 
misstated accounts than participants in the conservative disclosure-tone condition; however, the 
difference becomes statistically non-significant when interactions and control variables are 
included in the model. My statistical tests suffer from a lack of power due to a less than optimal 
sample size. Mean differences between the aggressive and conservative disclosure-tone 
condition were all in the predicted direction, which provides motivation for further investigation 
and additional data collection. Based on the test results, I cannot conclude that disclosure tone 
differentially affects the detection of misstated accounts.  
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In addition, I predicted media format to interact with disclosure tone increasing the effect of 
aggressive and conservative disclosure-tone, creating larger differences in accuracy between 
video and text media-format and disclosure-tone interactions. Contrary to my expectations, the 
difference between interactions was not different for media-format conditions; thus, video media 
format did not increase the effect of disclosure tone differentially than text media format. 
I predicted participants in the earnings-increasing misstatement condition to perceive an 
overstatement of earnings as a greater risk than an understatement of earnings and increase their 
scrutiny of the financial statements; and, as a result, be more accurate in detecting misstatements 
than participants in the earnings-decreasing misstatement condition. As predicted, participants in 
the earnings-increasing condition were more accurate in detecting misstatements than those in 
the earnings-decreasing condition, which provides support for my hypothesis. While I 
hypothesized an interaction with media format, I found no difference for media-format and 
earnings-condition interactions.  
Lastly, I investigated the effect of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition on 
participants’ criterion in reporting an account as misstated. I hypothesized that participants in the 
video media format, conservative disclosure tone, and earnings-decreasing misstatements would 
require larger perceived misstatements (positive or negative) in order to report an account as 
misstated than participants in the text media-format, aggressive disclosure-tone, and earnings-
increasing misstatements, respectively. Participants in the video media-format condition rated 
their confidence in the extreme categories more frequently than participants in the text media-
format condition, but there was no difference for disclosure tone or earnings conditions.  
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In summary, media format had an effect on participants’ criterion in assessing account 
balances, but not accuracy in detecting misstatements; disclosure tone had a marginal effect on 
accuracy, but not on criterion; and earnings condition had an effect on accuracy, but not on 
criterion. It should be noted, my test results lack power due to a less than optimal sample size, 
but the results provide motivation for additional data gathering and further investigation of my 
research questions.  
My study contributes to the literature by providing financial statement users with a better 
understanding of the effect of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition on non-
professional users’ decision-making quality and provides motivation for further investigation. In 
addition, my study informs regulatory agencies and stock exchanges by providing evidence that 
media format (earnings condition) affect participants’ criterion in detecting misstatements. 
Finally, investigating the effects and interactions of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings 
condition on the quality of participant decision-making utilizing SDT introduces a new set of 
methods and measures to an emerging area of accounting literature. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses financial statement 
analysis; Section 3 provides background and hypothesis development; Section 4 discusses 
research methodology; Section 5 presents a discussion of results; Section 6 examines potential 
alternative explanations; and, Section 7 is the conclusions and potential limitations.  
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2. Financial Statement Analysis 
2.1. Theory of Financial Statement User Decision-making 
Maines and McDaniel (2000) present a theory of financial statement user decision-making, 
which Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson (2002) describe as the beginning of a “theory of format 
effects” (page 784). They find that the ease with which financial statements users process 
financial information affects decision-making. Their theory of format effects focuses on 
information within the financial statements (comprehensive earnings) not the financial 
statements; however, the theory can be adapted to develop testable hypotheses regarding 
financial statement users’ decision-making (Libby et al., 2002). 
A second model, developed by Clements and Wolfe (1997) suggests that media format has 
an indirect effect on financial statement users’ decision-making. They hypothesize and find that 
media format must interact with individual attributes (attitudes, experiences, perceptions, 
personality, and motivation) and feelings towards the message being communicated, and only 
then will decision-making be influenced. They argue that video increases reliance on peripheral 
cues and that the effect will be greater for financial statement users that feel better about video 
versus text media format.  
Clements and Wolfe (1997) also report research showing a number of social, cognitive and 
cultural characteristics interact to affect decision-making at every decision point, which is 
consistent with prior studies examining decision-making (e.g., Pijanowski, 2009; Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, and Welch, 2001). As a result, my model recognizes additional variables may 
affect financial statement user decision-making at each decision point; see Appendices M and N 
for a list of variables.  
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Insert Figure 1 Here 
2.2. Detecting Misstatements 
Based on the hundreds of restatements that occur each year (Audit Analytics, 2013) and 
survey evidence reported in Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), material misstatements and 
earnings management5 occur often in practice; however, detecting misstatements has been 
difficult and may only happen several years after the misstatement (Graham et al., 2005; 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010). Prior research on earnings management suggests that 
intentional misstatements are even more difficult to detect (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1996; 
Rosman, Biggs, and Hoskin, 2012), which may be due to deliberately misleading financial 
statements and disclosures. Models designed to detect earnings management fall well below 
what managers surveyed in Graham et al. (2005) suggest occurs (Phillips, Pincus, and Rego, 
2003; Dechow et al., 1996; Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez, 2008). 
2.3. Financial Statement Disclosure Variation 
Most communication of financial information to external stakeholders is carefully regulated 
and scrutinized. Government agencies, auditors, exchanges, and information intermediaries 
rigorously examine financial reports and disclosures from management. Despite the attention on 
financial disclosure, video financial reports are primarily classified as voluntary disclosure, 
which is subjected to limited regulation.6 As a result, the potential for obfuscating information is 
greater for video versus text financial reports.  
                                                          
5 Managers surveyed believe that all firms manage earnings (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). 
6 This statement does not apply to live webcasts of new information, such as an earnings release. Firms are restricted 
from disclosing fraudulent information and some communication is restricted during firm blackout periods (Ettredge 
et al., 2001). The firms’ public accountants have no responsibility for information reported unless specific reference 
to their audit opinion is made in the disclosure. 
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Video financial reports can be enhanced with cues that are not investment decision relevant, 
such as managers’ personal characteristics, rationalizing past events (EHS, 2012), positive or 
negative language used, and/or suggestions of future performance in an attempt to enhance firm 
stock price and managements’ professional reputation (Graham et al., 2005; Harvey, 2008). 
Disclosure that is successful in sculpting positive professional and firm reputation increases the 
value and liquidity of the firm’s stock, improves management’s prospects, and can increase 
personal wealth of managers (Ettredge, Richardson, and Scholz, 2001). Therefore, management 
has incentives to prepare disclosure that will be positively received by the market (Graham et al., 
2005). 
Video introduces selective information into an already complex and uncertain decision-
making process. If financial statement users understood the risks video media-format presents, 
they would weigh the narrative information in video financial reports with appropriate 
skepticism, unless extraneous cues in video affect their risk assessment. Carlson and George 
(2004) provide evidence that rich media-format (e.g., video, face-to-face) affects users’ 
confidence in detecting deception, which suggests that video media-format may affect decision-
making quality. Orcutt (2003) argued that an unjustified increase in financial statement users’ 
confidence without an increase in the quality of information would result in an increase in risk. If 
video media-format decreases participants’ accuracy in detecting misstatements and increases 
confidence in account assessment, the quality of their decision-making will be lower than 
participants in the text media-format condition.  
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2.4. Misstatement Detection as a Proxy for Investment Decision-Making Quality 
In a recent survey of earnings quality research published in top accounting journals, Dechow 
et al. (2010), summarize the studies that examine the effect of financial statement users’ 
understanding of accounting information on stock pricing. They report, “… more informed 
investors better process the information in the financial statements, which results in less 
mispricing” (page 356). Therefore, examining whether video, disclosure tone, and earnings 
condition affects the detection of misstatements should provide insight into the determinants of 
financial statement users’ decision-making quality.  
I argue that the detection of seeded misstatements is a suitable proxy for financial statement 
analysis decision-making quality for several reasons. First, balances reported in financial 
statements directly affect earnings and earnings quality, measures that are valued by the market, 
analysts, and regulatory agencies (Ball and Brown, 1968; Beaver, 1968; Graham et al., 2005; 
Dechow et al., 2010). Second, material misstatements if detected result in a restatement. A large 
number of studies examine the consequences of restatements and of particular concern in this 
study is the potential shareholder value loss if a firm restates a misstatement. Studies have 
documented that restatements cost investors billions of dollars in decreased market value 
annually (EHS, 2012), including a short-term negative market adjusted return of 9.2% (20%) due 
to errors (fraud) (Dechow et al., 2010).  
Third, in a quarterly set of financial statements, many of the balances reported are subject to 
management discretion under U.S. GAAP. In a survey of managers, more than 40% reported that 
they would utilize an accounting manipulation within U.S. GAAP to meet short-term earnings 
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targets (Graham et al., 2005)7. This suggests the likelihood of accrual manipulation is 
widespread; however, studies examining accruals have been unable to produce a model that can 
accurately measure discretionary accruals, capture accrual quality, or detect earnings 
management through accruals (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Finally, reliance on misstatements is likely to decrease financial statement users’ ability to 
properly assess the implications of accruals on future earnings. Financial statement users that 
understand the implications of earnings persistence are less likely to misprice earnings (Dechow 
et al., 2010). The quality of participant decision-making is based on several factors, some of 
which are not measureable in an experiment. I include covariates that have been shown to 
influence decision-making quality and participants were randomly assigned to all conditions. In 
summary, the task of detecting seeded misstatement balances captures several skills that are 
relevant to financial analysis decision-making quality.  
2.5 Signal Detection Theory 
Accounting diagnostic tasks generally involve distinguishing a signal in a complex and 
uncertain environment. The uncertainty has been shown to induce variation in the criterion 
required for reporting a signal is (is not) present across financial statement users. My study 
utilizes SDT methods and measures as presented in Sprinkle and Tubbs (1998) and Ramsay and 
Tubbs (2005), who credit the applied and theoretical psychology literature for developing SDT, 
and rely heavily on the work of Swets and Pickett (1982); Swets (1986a; b); and Swets (1996).  
                                                          
7 I sum their totals for items 3, 5, 6, and 9, (40%, 27%, 21%.and 7%, respectively) from Table 6. 
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SDT theorizes that diagnostic decisions require two cognitive processes: discrimination and 
decision. The discrimination process involves an assessment of whether signal (misstatement) 
exists, an accuracy measure. The decision process is the criterion the signal must exceed in order 
for the decision maker to say the signal is present. SDT measures of participant accuracy and 
criterion can be calculated contemporaneously. Non-SDT measures of accuracy do not control 
for participants’ criterion in measuring accuracy (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 
2005). The simple SDT 2x2 matrix illustrated in Figure 2 captures the four possible outcomes in 
each cell.  
Insert Figure 2 Here 
In order to measure the effect of the manipulations on accuracy and participants’ criterion in 
my experiment I employ SDT methods and measures, described in Sprinkle and Tubbs, (1998) 
and Ramsay and Tubbs (2005). SDT is the appropriate statistical method for four reasons. First, 
my experimental task is a diagnostic task. Participants analyzed accounting information to 
determine whether balances are misstated or not misstated. Sprinkle and Tubbs, (1998) note, “In 
its simplest form, SDT applies to those tasks when an individual is confronted with a stimulus 
that belongs to one of two categories, and the individual must choose between one of two 
responses based upon that stimulus. One response is appropriate if the stimulus is from the first 
category (signal), while the other response is appropriate if the stimulus is from the second 
category (noise)” (page 478).  
Second, the potential for response bias to affect accuracy is particularly high in my 
experiment. Participants in my study are likely to have or develop priors about the percentage of 
balances misstated and should make decisions accordingly. In addition, individuals may not 
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adjust to evidence at the same rate and their rate of adjustment may depend on whether they 
perceive the experimental task as confirming or disconfirming their prior beliefs (Bamber, 
Ramsay, and Tubbs, 1997).  
I contend that the vast majority of balances reported in practice are not misstated even in 
years that require restatement. The average number of issues per restatement has not exceeded 
2.44 since 2001 (Audit Analytics, 2013). In practice, there is a positive correlation between the 
number of issues and accounts restated. In my experimental task, there are two misstatements 
that affect five (5) of 20 balances (25%) on the face of the financial statements and two (2) of the 
four (4) reserve balances (50%) in the notes to the financial statements, which is more than in 
practice, reflecting a desire to create a detectible effect.  
Third, participants are likely to perceive and estimate costs (benefits) of their decisions 
differently. Participants in this study have diverse backgrounds (e.g., finance, accounting, and 
auditing) and personal motivations for voluntarily participating (e.g., interested, obligated, kind, 
sympathetic). Therefore, I expect the diversity of the study’s participants to affect the variation in 
decision criterion required in order to elicit a signal (misstated) response. 
Fourth, SDT methods and measures provide superior measures of accuracy and participants’ 
criterion in accounting diagnostic tasks versus non-SDT measures. Controlling for participants’ 
criterion becomes more important in tasks where participants are likely to exhibit variation in 
decision criterion for determining the signal (account is misstated) exists. SDT is appropriate for 
my experiment, a diagnostic task requiring participants to determine whether balances are 
misstated, “signal” or not misstated, “noise” in quarterly financial statements. Therefore, SDT 
measures improve the validity of the results reported (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). 
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3. Background and Hypothesis Development 
Financial analysis involves making decisions in a complex financial reporting environment 
and present investment risk (Hirshleifer, 1965). Financial statement users must form beliefs 
about the probability and desirability of outcomes of their decisions based on imperfect 
knowledge about the future. Ideally, financial statement users’ would consider all the outcomes, 
the probabilities, and their utilities for all the possible outcomes prior to making a decision. 
However, financial statement users are subject to limited cognitive abilities and cannot assess all 
possible outcomes. As a result, financial statement users rely on decision-making shortcuts 
(heuristics) when faced with decisions they are not able to systematically process (e.g., Brazel, 
Agoglia, and Hatfield, 2004; Lucey and Dowling, 2005; Rosman, Biggs, Graham, and Bible, 
2007). Research on decision-making heuristics shows that in some decision environments, 
applying a heuristic strategy is appropriate, in others it causes biases and results in predictable 
errors (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
3.1. Cognitive Load Theory 
Prior research examining decision-making in complex environments relies heavily on the 
cognitive load theory. Cognitive load theory explains how limited working memory capacity 
affects decision-making, breaking down cognitive load into three categories: 1) intrinsic 
cognitive load is the burden created by the task and the decision makers’ expertise; 2) extraneous 
cognitive load is the burden caused by information that is not decision relevant; and 3) germane 
cognitive load is the memory consumed by understanding and processing the task and 
information (Sweller, Merrienboer, and Paas, 1998). Decision makers assess the costs and 
benefits of decision-making strategies with the desire to minimize cognitive effort while feeling 
confident in the accuracy of their decision. 
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Research examining auditor decision-making in electronic environments finds that auditors 
use heuristic strategies to reduce cognitive effort (e.g., Brazel et al., 2004; Lucey and Dowling, 
2005; Rosman et al., 2007). In a study examining electronic versus face-to-face review 
strategies, Brazel et al., (2004) find that auditors use a more systematic review approach when 
they expect a face-to-face review rather than an electronic review. In a study examining a 
misstatement detection task similar to my study, Bible, Graham, and Rosman (2005), find that 
auditors reviewing workpapers in electronic format were less able to identify seeded errors than 
those examining paper workpapers. In a second study, Rosman et al. (2007) examine the 
strategies of successful auditors (participants) in the Bible et al. (2005) study, and they find that 
auditors that are more successful in identifying seeded errors were able to adapt their strategy by 
minimizing cognitive load versus auditors that performed poorly. Successful auditors reduced 
their cognitive effort by spending less time planning and acquiring information and more time 
elaborating about and evaluating information (Rosman et al., 2007). 
Maines and McDaniel (2000) examine the effect of location and presentation on 
nonprofessional financial statement user use of comprehensive earnings information. They find 
that when comprehensive earnings is presented in disaggregate format and the effect of 
comprehensive earnings on earnings is unambiguous, financial statement users weight the 
comprehensive earnings information in their decision. They show that financial statement users 
have limited cognitive resources and they are less likely to use information that increases 
cognitive costs. 
Theoretically, video, disclosure tone, and earnings condition have the potential to increase or 
decrease cognitive effort. In order to decrease cognitive effort, the conditions must reduce the 
extraneous and/or increase germane cognitive load by efficiently communicating decision 
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relevant information, which offsets the visual and audible cues that are not present in text. 
Another way video could reduce cognitive load would be to cause decision makers to ignore the 
video financial report and search for decision relevant information from other sources. 
Conditions that increase cognitive effort reduce germane and/ or increase extraneous cognitive 
load by confounding relevant cues with cues that are not relevant. Based on studies cited above, I 
expect video, disclosure tone (aggressive or conservative), and earnings condition (earnings-
increasing or -decreasing) will increase extraneous cognitive load and reduce the detection of 
seeded misstatements if financial statement users do not develop appropriate strategies. 
3.2. Theories of Media Format 
Two primary themes for rating media-format richness exist in the communication and 
marketing literature. In communication literature, rich media delivers high levels of information, 
facilitates real-time interaction and feedback, and uses natural language (Daft and Lengel, 1984; 
Kock, 2004, 2005). In marketing literature, rich media is content that has vivid multimedia 
elements, such as sound and video and supports interactivity (Rosenkrans, 2009).  
In define rich media as, “media with high information content, presented in vivid and salient 
animations, and on the Internet” (e.g., from rich to less rich face-to-face, video conferencing, 
online video, email text, paper text and numeric text). Daft and Lengel (1984) define the richness 
of communication as, “the potential information carrying capacity of data. If the communication 
of an item of data, such as a wink, provides substantial new understanding, it would be 
considered rich. If the datum provides little understanding, it would be low in richness” (page 7). 
Rich media sources providing greater carrying capacity of data. Daft and Lengel (1984) 
categorize communication media from highest (face-to-face) to lowest (numeric computer 
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output) based on feedback capability, communication channel, source, and language, see Figure 
3, panel A.  
Insert Figure 3 Here 
Feedback capability is based on the medium’s ability to facilitate timely and unambiguous 
feedback. Communication channels are visual, audio, text, and combinations including more 
than one channel, with richer media communications combining visual and audio channels. The 
source of the information relates to the personal or impersonal nature of the communication, with 
more rich media providing higher levels of personal communication. The languages include 
body, natural (voice), and numeric (text). Video financial reporting would likely be placed in the 
middle of their scale, because it has a high data carrying capacity, uses natural language, but is 
not personalized, and does not facilitate timely feedback. 
Daft and Lengel (1984) argue that media richness should match the complexity of the 
phenomena being described. Simple phenomena can be resolved using an objective 
computational process and therefore, less rich media is optimal for developing a resolution. 
Conversely, complex phenomena require additional time spent searching and analyzing 
information and solutions beyond what text and numeric information can provide, thus, video 
would be more optimal than text for investment decisions. They note decision makers often have 
difficulty analyzing costs, benefits, and outcomes of multiple alternatives for complex tasks.  
While their theory argues richer media should be utilized to communicate information in 
complex tasks, empirical research has not supported this contention. The inconsistencies lead to 
development of the theory of media naturalness (Kock, 2004; 2005). Empirical research 
examining hypotheses supported by the theory of media richness finds mixed results. Rich media 
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formats facilitated the communication of more information, but when associated with task 
complexity did not result in better decision-making performance in all instances. 
The theory of media naturalness was developed by Kock (2004) to provide a theoretical 
rational for the mixed empirical results. Media naturalness places “natural” face-to-face 
communication at the center of the scale and other media formats are evaluated based on their 
similarities to, or differences from face-to-face communication. The theory of media naturalness 
suggests media that communicates more or less information than face-to-face communication 
hinders information processing ability (Kock, 2004, 2005). 
Email is an example of less rich media being perceived as an effective format for 
communication of complex information. Email has evolved to a point where users are able to 
quickly respond, reducing ambiguity, and providing timely feedback (Kock, 2004, 2005). As 
communication technology improves methods of communication can be adapted to more closely 
represent the qualities of face-to-face communication (e.g., video conferencing). 
The theory of media naturalness suggests modes of communication that diverge from natural 
face-to-face communication increase cognitive effort and increase misinterpretation (Kock, 
2004, 2005). The theory does not imply that either video or text will be a more effective format 
of communication than the other for a given task. However, the theory does suggest that the 
further away from face-to-face communication the format is the more it will result in lower 
decision quality.  
Video provides more multi-sensory information than text, some of the information is not 
relevant to the task. The theories of media format are at odds as to the format that will be more 
effective in communicating misstatement detection information. This leaves open to empirical 
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testing whether media format affects the detection of misstatements; however, both theories 
suggest there will be a different effect of format for video and text.  
In summary, investment decision-making occurs in a complex-uncertain environment and 
involve investment risk (Hirschleifer, 1965; Maines and McDaniel, 2000; Kelton and 
Pennington, 2012). Video provides influential cues that are not relevant to the financial analysis 
decision-making task, which attract viewer attention and decreases systematic processing (Short 
et al., 1976). Based on the theoretical and empirical research cited above, I hypothesize video 
will increase cognitive costs and effort, negatively affecting financial statement users’ decision-
making quality; therefore, I posit hypothesis 1, stated in alternative form: 
H1: Participants in the video media-format condition will be less accurate in detecting 
misstated accounts than those in the text media-format condition. 
3.3. Disclosure Tone 
The tone of a disclosure introduces information that is not relevant in most investment-
related decisions; however, prior research finds tone affects financial statement users’ decisions 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). When credible optimistic letters are linked to audited 
financial statements, financial statement users increase future earnings estimates (Hodge, 2001). 
Financial statement users judge the credibility of favorable analyst reports to be lower when 
analysts have a banking relationship with the firm, strength of argument does not influence 
financial statement users’ decisions when the argument is favorable (Hirst, Koonce, and Simko, 
1995). Financial statement users judge firms that are able to accurately forecast estimates over 
multiple periods better than firms that aggressively forecast estimates (Hirst, Jackson, and 
Koonce, 2003). Financial statement users judge managers that are more forthcoming with 
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disclosures with greater as more credible, especially when the news is negative (Libby and Tan, 
1999; Tan, Libby, Hutton, 2002; Mercer, 2005). These studies show that tone affects financial 
statement users’ decision-making and that the effects vary by interaction of tone and content. 
Mercer (2004) defines “disclosure credibility” as “investors’ perceptions of the believability 
of a particular disclosure” (page 186), and she shows that it is important in financial statement 
users’ weighting of information. She reports that disclosure credibility is not the same as 
management credibility, the latter being a primary determinant of the first, but disclosure 
credibility is assessed for each disclosure and management credibility is more enduring. She 
argues that financial statement users first assess managements’ incentives when evaluating 
disclosure credibility and then move onto assessing management credibility.  
Mercer (2005) reports that financial statement users also evaluate internal and external 
assurance that affect the credibility and weighting of information disclosed. Sources of internal 
assurance that enhance disclosure credibility include the board of directors, audit committee, and 
internal auditors. The primary source of external assurance is public accounting auditors, but 
journalists and analysts also are theorized to have a role in monitoring. Overall, disclosure that is 
consistent with managements’ incentives is expected to be less credible Mercer (2004) and 
increase financial statement users’ skepticism (Matsumoto et al., 2011).  
Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012) show that presenting information in positive terms results in 
more favorable evaluations than does presenting information in negative terms. “At the most 
basic level, positive and negative language has a substantial influence on how information is 
processed. Language also influences how information is both perceived and understood,” (Davis 
et al., 2012, page 846). If financial statement users determine the tone of the earnings release is 
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positive or negative, it may mitigate or dominate their judgment of managements’ incentives and 
credibility. 
The studies above show that financial statement users’ decision-making is affected by the 
tone of a message in assessing the credibility and weighting of that message. Financial statement 
users assess the credibility and weight of information according to the tone of the message and 
its relationship with management incentives. Disclosure that contains misstatement, but increases 
believability in management (i.e., earnings-decreasing misstatement or conservative-tone 
message) is likely to reduce careful scrutiny and therefore, decrease detection of misstatements. 
Therefore, I posit hypothesis 2a, stated in alternative form: 
H2a: Participants in the conservative-tone condition will be less accurate in detecting 
misstated accounts than those in the aggressive-tone condition. 
Several studies examine the effect of impression management on user judgments. These 
studies cover narratives in: tone in disclosure documents (Lang and Lundholm, 2000); tone in 
press releases (Henry, 2008); information content in conference call transcripts (Matsumoto et 
al., 2011); self-serving attributions in letters to shareholders (Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer, 
1983); order effects of positive and negative information in the president’s letter to shareholders 
(Baird and Zelin, 2000); color as rhetoric in annual reports (Courtis, 2004); hyperlinked and 
irrelevant information in web-based financial disclosures (Kelton, 2006); and attributions in 
restatements (EHS, 2012). These studies show that the media format, disclosure tone, 
information content, order of presentation, and attribution affect financial statement users’ 
decision-making. 
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The studies that are directly related to my study are the studies examining the interaction 
between media format and disclosure tone (Kelton, 2006; EHS, 2012). Kelton (2006) finds that 
viewing a company’s web-based financial disclosures causes an increase in cognitive load versus 
paper, results in nonprofessional financial statement users acquiring less information, making 
less accurate decisions, and taking more time making decisions. As noted above, EHS (2012) 
examine the effect of video and attribution for a restatement on financial statement users’ 
decision-making. They find that video interacts with attribution, affecting financial statement 
users’ investment valuations. These studies suggest that media format and disclosure tone will 
interact, resulting in an increased effect of disclosure tone; therefore, I posit hypotheses 2b and 
2c, stated in alternative form:  
H2b: Participants in the video conservative-tone condition will be less accurate in detecting 
misstated accounts than those in the text conservative-tone condition. 
H2c: Participants in the video aggressive-tone condition will be more accurate in detecting 
misstatements than those in the text aggressive-tone condition. 
3.4 Earnings-increasing versus -decreasing Misstatements 
Based on restatement data, both earnings-increasing and earnings-decreasing misstatements 
occur often. Restatements that negatively affect earnings exceed the number of positive 
restatements, suggesting a greater downside risk to financial statement users as the market 
responds more negatively to negative restatements (Audit Analytics, 2013). In 2012, 
approximately 53% of restatements had an effect on net earnings with 277 (58) negative 
(positive) net earnings effects. Restatements by design are material events for a firm and firms 
with restatements affecting net earnings experienced an $11 million change in net earnings on 
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average in 2012 (Audit Analytics, 2013). In 2012, aggregate total negative (positive) changes to 
net earnings were approximately $2.8 billion ($900 million) (Audit Analytics, 2013). Prior 
academic research suggests the aggregate market reaction to restatements could exceed $12 
billion in an average year (EHS, 2012). The restatements demonstrate that both earnings-
decreasing and increasing misstatements occur in practice and that they are generally important 
events for managers, firms, and stakeholders. 
At first look, one might argue that earnings-increasing misstatements present a greater risk to 
an acquiring firm; however, I posit that earnings-decreasing misstatements present a similar risk 
for two reasons. First, misstatements that affect earnings are likely to reverse in the short-term 
resulting in future inflated earnings reports. Some errors affecting net income correct themselves 
in the following period. If an expense is overstated in one period, that expense will reverse in the 
next period, if not manipulated again. For example, if a company's ending inventory were 
understated, the cost of goods sold would be too high in the current period. In the following 
period, the cost of goods sold would be too low.  
Second, managers of the acquired firm that remain with the organization after the acquisition 
have compensation and professional incentives to increase future earnings at the expense of 
current shareholders of the firm being acquired. Those shareholders lose equity value if reported 
earnings are understated and, as a result, the acquiring firm bases its valuation on lower earnings.  
Managers of acquiring firms have incentives to keep top managers after the acquisition, 
because their departure is negatively related to firm performance and firm satisfaction 
(Haleblian, McNamera, Carpenter, and Davison, 2009). Cannella and Hambrick (1993) report 
that approximately 51% of managers of acquired firms remain on two years after the acquisition. 
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If managers of target firms are compensated with salary and do not hold equity, they may 
perceive an increase in their future salary as a better opportunity than having a higher stock 
price. This could result in management of earnings downward, prior to the acquisition, to make 
future earnings targets more achievable; thus, future earnings will be inflated, unjustifiably 
increasing management’s compensation and reputation. I contend earnings-decreasing 
misstatements present similar economic and investment risk to earnings-increasing 
misstatements.  
It is not evident from the prior research that financial statement users will view earnings-
increasing and earnings-decreasing condition as equal risks. As noted above, financial statement 
users consider disclosure less credible when it is aligned with management incentives. In 
general, disclosure/restatements that decrease earnings are considered more credible by financial 
statement users (Mercer, 2004). However, positive or negative events may dominate financial 
statement user decision-making versus management incentives or credibility. If financial 
statement users determine that beating (missing) projected earnings is a positive (negative) event 
in the experimental task, it may mitigate or dominate their assessment of disclosure credibility. 
Whether earnings-increasing or earnings-decreasing misstatements dominate the detection of 
seeded misstatements remains an empirical question. 
I expect participants in the earnings-increasing condition to perceive Sound Systems Co. 
exceeding earnings projections as more aligned with managements’ incentives and a greater 
investment risk than the earnings-decreasing condition (fall short of earnings projections). I 
expect participants that perceive exceeding earnings and greater risk of earnings-increasing 
misstatements to expend greater effort examining the case information. As a result, I expect 
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participants in the earnings-increasing condition to be more successful in detecting 
misstatements than participants in the earnings-decreasing condition.  
In addition, I expect media format to interact with misstatement type and increase 
participants’ awareness of managements’ incentives and the risks associated with earnings-
increasing or -decreasing misstatements. Since video media format has been shown to enhance 
personal characteristics of the presenter, I expect the video earnings-release to have a stronger 
effect on participants’ awareness of managements’ incentives than the text earnings-release. 
Therefore, I posit hypotheses 3a and 3b, stated in alternative form: 
H3a: Participants in the earnings-decreasing condition will be less accurate in detecting 
misstated accounts than those in the earnings-increasing condition. 
H3b: Participants in the earnings-decreasing condition will exhibit smaller differences in the 
percentage of misstatements detected between the earnings release format conditions (video 
or text) than the earnings-increasing condition. 
3.5 Media Format, Disclosure Tone, and Earnings Condition on Participants’ Criterion 
As noted above, SDT theorizes diagnostic tasks consist of two independent cognitive 
processes: discrimination (accuracy) and decision criterion (participants’ criterion) (Ramsay and 
Tubbs, 2005). This recognizes a participant must first be able to distinguish between a misstated 
account and an account that is not misstated and then based on their perception, any account that 
is identified as misstated must exceed a threshold value for them to report the account as 
misstated. Media format, disclosure tone and earnings condition all have potential to affect 
participants’ criterion as well as their accuracy. 
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Video media format presents information that is multi-sensory with vivid stimuli and is likely 
to attract and hold attention and excite the imagination (Appiah, 2006). The multi-sensory 
experience of video attracts viewers’ attention, engages them, affects trust, and elicits affect, 
which may exert influence on decision-making (Short et al. 1976; EHS, 2012). Vivid stimuli in 
communication of information has been shown to increase reliance on cues not relevant to the 
task, such as communicator characteristics (EHS, 2012) and entertainment value of the video 
versus text (Clements and Wolfe, 1997; Clements, 1999; Clements and Wolfe, 2000). Therefore, 
I expect video presentation of financial information to increase a participants’ criterion to report 
an account as misstated (e.g., on average, participants in the video condition will require larger 
perceived misstatements versus participants in the text condition in order to report that a balance 
is definitely, or almost definitely misstated). 
As a result, of the increased criterion to report an account as misstated, participants in the 
video condition should be less confident in their account assessments. There could be an increase 
or decrease in hits/misses (false alarms/correct rejections) due to a change in criterion; however, 
I do not examine the change in criterion on a within subjects basis. Hypotheses 1 through 3b 
address participants’ accuracy based on condition. Hypotheses 4a through 4c address the effect 
of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition on participants’ criterion in their 
assessment of accounts (misstated or not misstated). 
In summary, video media format attracts viewer attention, decreases systematic processing, 
and elicits affect (emotional response) versus text media format, which affects decision-making 
(Short et al., 1976). Therefore, I expect video to focus participants’ attention on the extraneous 
information (i.e., CEO Poppy Mason’s characteristics, quality of presentation, future projects) to 
a greater extent than text. If my hypothesis is accurate, participants in the video condition will 
29 
 
have a larger Ca value on average, than participants in the text condition. Therefore, I posit 
hypothesis 4a stated in alternative form: 
H4a: Participants in the video condition will have a larger criterion value (less extreme 
confidence) for their account assessments than those in the text condition. 
Disclosure tone is the language used to describe managements’ communication of firm 
performance (aggressive or conservative) in an earnings release. In an earnings release managers 
engage in impression management, which affects financial statement user decision-making 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Prior research documents an effect on financial analysis 
decision-making and a market reaction to disclosure tone even after controlling for actual 
financial results (Matsumoto et al., 2011; Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012; Price et al., 2012; 
Henry, 2008).  
Disclosures are designed to affect users’ perception of and emphasis on information rather 
than focusing users on the content (Craig et al, 2001). Henry (2008) notes that earnings releases 
are communicated directly to financial statement users; therefore, the potential influence of the 
disclosure tone is particularly relevant. If the disclosure tone creates a particular view of the firm 
or manager that resonates (positively/negatively) with financial statement users it could affect the 
participants’ criterion to report an account as misstated. 
The studies above show that financial statement users’ decision-making is affected by the 
tone of a disclosure. Disclosure that affects the participants’ assessment of management is likely 
to affect participants’ criterion in their account assessment; therefore, I posit hypothesis 4b, 
stated in alternative form: 
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H4b: Participants in the aggressive-tone condition will have a smaller criterion value (more 
extreme confidence) for their account assessments than those in the conservative-tone 
condition. 
Studies examining financial statement user response to misstatements find that firms 
experience negative returns when misstatements and waived misstatements are reported. In 
general participants’ reaction to a misstatement vary based on the direction of the misstatement 
on earnings as misstatements that reduce income result in larger market value decreases (GAO, 
2006; Omer et al., 2012; Audit Analytics, 2013). This result was confirmed in an experiment 
examining the effect of restatements, which reports that magnitude, earnings direction, and the 
number of balances restated affect financial statement user decision-making (Palmrose et al., 
2004). 
I expect participants in the earnings-increasing condition to perceive the condition as a 
greater risk. As a result, I expect those participants to decrease their criterion for their account 
assessments; therefore, I posit hypotheses 4c, stated in alternative form: 
H4c: Participants in the earnings-increasing condition will have a smaller criterion value 
(more extreme confidence) in their account assessments than those in the earnings-decreasing 
condition. 
Insert Figure 4 Here 
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4. Research Methodology 
4.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the MSA, MBA, and EMBA programs at a flagship New 
England State University and staff level accountants recruited from six (6) regional and national 
accounting firms. The experiment was conducted online using Qualtrics software via 
participant’s computers. Participants were told their responses would remain anonymous and 
they were offered entry into a random drawing for one of two Amazon.com gift cards. In 
addition, MSA students were offered extra credit in their initial course for completion of the 
experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. Data was 
collected from MSA students starting May 20, 2014 through May 23, 2014; MBA/EMBA 
students starting June 16, 2014 through July 15, 2014; and, accounting firms July 30, 2014 
through August 29, 2014.  
These students and staff professionals are appropriate, because they are familiar with 
financial statements. The experimental task is not investing, but rather detecting misstatements in 
financial statements. Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk (2007) find that MBA students in their 
first year are appropriate surrogates for nonprofessional financial statement users when the task 
is of low integrative complexity and MBA students who are in their second year and/or have 
professional experience investing perform similar to nonprofessional financial statement users.  
My model of financial statement user decision-making is based on the decision-making 
model in Maines and McDaniel (2000) (identified as complex by Elliott, et al., 2007); however, 
my experimental task is not as complex as weighting comprehensive-earnings information into 
investment valuation decisions. My experimental task does not ask financial statement users to 
evaluate the effect of misstatements on net earnings or understand the linkage from 
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misstatements to net earnings. In addition, the experimental task consists of condensed financial 
statements, simple numbers, and ratios/percentage changes calculated for the participants to 
reduce complexity. Instructions include a statement that the ratios and percentage changes are 
accurate and have been double-checked, so participants can rely on their accuracy. 
There were 104 MSA, 17 MBA/EMBA, and 10 staff level accountants in practice that started 
the experiment. Participants were then disqualified if: they willingly chose not to participate after 
reading the experimental disclosure (19); spent less than 15 or more than 1,500 minutes on the 
experiment (28/2); spent less than five minutes on the primary questionnaire and selected the 
same confidence interval 13 or more times (15); or, were assigned in Qualtrics to more than one 
condition (1 actual plus 2 reported), which resulted in 64 participant observations for most tests. 
Participants missing variables necessary to complete tests were excluded from those tests, 
resulting in a smaller sample size for some tests. The rate of participant dropout and the 
difficulty obtaining additional volunteer participants resulted in a less than optimal sample size.8  
Participants were randomly assigned and equally distributed between conditions; however, 
the number of participant observations in each condition is not equal. Through a review of the 
data, the loss of participants does not appear to be related to the experiment. There is an 
approximately equal number of participants in each of the main conditions (media format, 
disclosure tone, and earnings condition). Statistical tests below use appropriate statistics 
considering the less than optimal sample size and the unbalanced experimental conditions.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
                                                          
8 Additional experiments are planned and if necessary, I may rely on Amazon Mechanical Turk and/or Qualtrics, 
which are pay services for qualified participants. 
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Participant data were primarily drawn from the MSA program (97% of useable 
observations), so the demographic results are largely homogenous. Participants were on average: 
within the 18 to 24 year old range (97%); 48% female and 52% male; had less than 1 year 
working post-graduation; 75% had no investment experience; and reported investment risk 
profiles of 25% high risk, 43% moderate risk, and 35% low risk. Despite the large number of 
participants from the MSA program, there were some demographic differences between the 
groups discussed below.  
Participants in the text condition were marginally statistically less comfortable using a 
computer versus participants in the video condition (1.94 versus 1.54, respectively). The average 
age of participants in the earnings-decreasing condition was marginally statistically significantly 
higher than those in earnings-increasing condition. The difference was primarily driven by two 
participants in earnings-decreasing condition who were 45 or older. In addition, participants in 
the earnings-increasing condition rated their mental effort lower on average than participants in 
the earnings-decreasing condition (neither high nor low versus high).  
Participants in the aggressive condition had more participants who had completed an 
advanced degree. There were four participants randomly assigned to the aggressive condition 
who had completed an advanced degree (e.g., JD, MS, MBA), versus one assigned to the 
conservative condition. Participants in the conservative condition rated their mental effort higher, 
but were happier when completing the survey versus those in the aggressive condition. In 
addition, participants in the conservative condition rated their cognitive learning style as less 
visual versus those in the aggressive condition, and use the Internet less often to search for 
information. 
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The demographic data suggest that the characteristics of the participants were relatively 
homogenous across cells, especially professional experience and investment experience. 
ANCOVA tests including: professional experience, learning style, likeability, trust, accounting 
and finance classes, age, comfort with computer, emotion, and investment experience were 
performed. See Appendices M and N for the list of covariates. All covariates were non-
statistically significant, except professional experience; therefore, tables presented below are 
based on ANOVAs including professional experience. Interactions are excluded from the 
ANOVAs tabled, because all interactions were non-statistically significant and if included, may 
induce multicollinearity due to the unbalanced cell sizes (Carey, 2012).  
4.2 Experimental Task 
Participants assume the role of financial analyst in the Investment Office for ECT 
Electronics, a fictitious retail company. Participants received case instructions and financial 
information for a fictitious target firm, Sound Systems, Co. See Appendices E and F for 
participant instructions. The financial information included one of four earnings releases for Q2 
2013 (video or text) with two tone conditions (aggressive or conservative); Q2 2013 quarterly 
statements (actual and ECT Technologies’ internally developed projection), which include a 
balance sheet, earnings statement, and cash flow statement; and Q1 2013 quarterly financial 
statements. See Appendices I and J for the earnings releases, and Appendices C and D for the 
manipulated financial statements. 
The Q2 2013 earnings release and actual financial statements have two manipulations (Cost 
of Sales and Sales Returns and Allowances) each in the same direction increasing or decreasing 
earnings. EPS projections were held constant across the earnings condition ($.60/common share). 
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The change in earnings due to the two manipulations versus the EPS projection was 
$.13/common share. Financial statement users were instructed to focus on Sound Systems Co.’s 
balances (Q2 2013 Actual) as the source of differences (Bedard and Biggs, 1991).  
The case materials have been adapted from a workpaper developed by Biggs and Wright, 
(1995, workpaper). See Appendices A and B for the unmanipulated financial statements. The 
statements are currently utilized in a New England State University intermediate accounting 
course as part of a case designed to teach the detection of earnings management through 
financial analysis. Biggs and Wright (1995, workpaper) adjusted the financials for a tool 
manufacturing company, creating a new unadjusted set of financials and then seeded errors 
(misstatements) into the corrected financials, which is the primary difference between the 
projected and actual statements.  
The first misstatement is an improper allocation of selling, general, administrative and other 
expenses (hereinafter SGA&O,) expense to manufacturing overhead expense following Bedard 
and Biggs, (1991). Their experimental manipulation decreases SGA&O expense, increases 
inventory on the balance sheet, and increases cost of sales reported in the earnings statement. In 
Bedard and Biggs (1991), the portion of SGA&O overhead expense that flows through the cost 
of sales is mischaracterized, but has the same effect as flowing through SGA&O decreasing net 
earnings. 
According to Bedard and Biggs (1991, p. 626), “The premise underlying the case 
construction was that a subject could not identify the error that caused the discrepancies (in the 
financial statements) unless those discrepancies were considered (together) as a pattern. . . If 
these discrepancies are considered as one pattern to be explained, then the resulting conclusion is 
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that some part of SGA&O expense was capitalized to inventory (and under a FIFO system was 
partially expensed in cost of sales).” Similar to Bedard and Biggs (1991), in my experiment 
participants who identify the effects of the misstatements as part of a pattern will be more 
successful in detecting misstatements.  
The second misstatement is an improper calculation of bad debts expenses. The experimental 
manipulation decreases/increases bad debts expense, and decreases/increases net sales reported 
in the earnings statement and accounts receivable in the balance sheet. The two seeded 
misstatements both increase earnings or decrease earnings, see Appendices C and D, respectively 
for detailed entries and statements.  
4.3 Dependent Variables 
4.3.1  Az (SDT measure of Accuracy) 
A measure of “accuracy, “Az,” described” in (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 
2005) is employed to test participants’ accuracy in detecting misstatements for the main analysis. 
Az represents the area under the receiver-operating characteristic (hereinafter, ROC) curve and is 
a surrogate of accuracy. This accuracy measure is a probability score with a lower limit of 0 and 
an upper limit of 1, where .5 represents chance performance. Another SDT measure of accuracy, 
“da,” represents the distance between the means of the signal and noise distributions and is 
defined in Figure 5. Tests below are based on Az, because, “Az is the most widely accepted 
measure of accuracy that is employed with confidence-rating experiments” (Ramsay and Tubbs, 
2005, page 159). Az does not assume that the distributions of signal or noise are normally 
distributed or have equal variances (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). 
Robustness tests utilizing da are discussed below. 
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The SDT measure Az is particularly appropriate for my experiment, which includes a 
confidence rating, because my manipulations are expected to influence both accuracy and 
criterion and the signal and noise distributions are not normally distributed with equal variances. 
See Figure 5, which is Table 1 presented in Ramsay and Tubbs (2005, page156), “SDT 
Measures, Empirical Surrogates, and Theoretical Constructs.” 
Insert Figure 5 Here 
I calculate two values of Az, in order to test my hypotheses. I generate the first value for Az 
(Az pooled) utilizing RSCORE-J, which uses, the jackknife method in combination with the 
RSCORE-II maximization algorithm to compute maximum likelihood estimates and their 
standard errors of the ROC parameters of a group ROC under the unequal-variance Gaussian 
model (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). “The jackknife method provides estimates that have reduced 
statistical bias,” (Dorfman and Berbaum, 1986, page 452). The primary method to calculate Az 
requires larger sample sizes than I was able to recruit to be fully reliable; thus, I calculate the 
second value of Az (Az individual), for each individual by inputting the binormal ROC values 
for the intercept (A) and (B) slope generated by RSCORE-J into the equation for Az in Figure 5. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
SDT measures allow for the estimation of participants’ binormal ROC curve through the 
confidence-rating procedure (see Figure 6 for the example ROC curve presented in Sprinkle and 
Tubbs, (1998); Ramsay and Tubbs, (2005)). Each point on the ROC curve represents a hit/false 
alarm rate pair associated with the estimated decision criterion of the participant.  
Insert Figure 6 Here 
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Stating Figure 6 in SDT terms (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005), the 
first observation is the one closest to the origin, corresponds to the hit rate of 0.30, and the false 
alarm rate of 0.10 that would occur if the participant responds the balance is, “misstated,” only 
when categorized as definitely or almost definitely misstated. The second observation on the 
dotted line corresponds to a hit rate of 0.60 and the false alarm rate of 0.40 that would occur if 
the participant responds, misstated whenever categorized as definitely or almost definitely 
misstated and probably misstated, but responds, not misstated, whenever categorized as possibly 
misstated, probably not misstated, or definitely or almost definitely not misstated. The third and 
fourth observations correspond to hit rates of (0.80 and 0.90) and false alarm rates of (0.50 and 
0.80), respectively. 
4.3.2 Ca (SDT measure of Participants’ Criterion) 
“Ca” is an SDT independent surrogate that represents the distance that the criterion is from a 
theoretical zero bias point (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). Ca can be 
interpreted as a conservative/liberal index that is associated with up to six values for each 
participant in each treatment condition. It is calculated in standard deviation units between the 
minor diagonal in an ROC graph and each estimated point on the ROC curve. The minor 
diagonal is the dotted line in figure 6, where the hit rate equals the rate of correct rejections (no 
bias, 1 minus false alarm rate). Points below the minor diagonal (positive values) happen when 
the hit rate is smaller than the rate of correct rejections. A positive Ca value indicates a tendency 
for that participants’ criterion to be conservative (participant reports “definitely not misstated” 
relatively frequently), a zero value indicates a tendency for that criterion to be neutral 
(participant reports “possibly misstated” relatively frequently), and a negative value indicates a 
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tendency for that criterion to be liberal (participant reports “definitely misstated” relatively 
frequently) (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998).  
SDT allows the relation between accuracy and the participant's criterion for misstatements to 
be explained. The Likert rating scale in my experiment ranges from 1 (definitely misstated) to 7 
(definitely not misstated). See Figure 7, Panel A, for the Likert scale. Participants who have a 
tendency to report confidence ratings in the extreme categories (definitely or almost definitely) 
have criterion values that are larger in absolute value relative to those who tendency is to report 
confidence ratings in the middle categories (possibly misstated). In my study, participants who 
have extreme criterion for misstatements will have Ca values further from zero than participants 
who have more moderate criterion for misstatements. 
5. Discussion of Results 
5.1 Manipulation Checks 
5.1.1 Media Format (Video or Text) 
Approximately 88% (56 of 64) of participants answered the manipulation check question (see 
Panel A, Table 3), two participants did not answer demographic questions and six participants 
skipped the manipulation check question. Of those who answered the question, 51 correctly 
answered the question, “What type of earnings disclosure did you receive?” for a correct 
identification rate of (91%). All five of the identification errors were spread across the video 
cells.  
A review of the timing data shows that the five who identified their earnings release as text 
rather than video spent approximately seven minutes reviewing the financial disclosure. One of 
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the participants may not have watched the video as s/he spent less than 60 seconds reviewing the 
earnings release; however, there was no tracking of participants’ viewing time on YouTube ™, 
so it is possible that the participant watched the video after advancing the page. Dropping these 
participants and participants who failed to answer the media format manipulation question results 
in increased statistical significance of ANOVA tests presented, but reduces two cells to three 
participants each; therefore, all five participants are included in the analyses presented below, 
when they have sufficient data available. 
Insert Table 3 Here 
5.1.2 Disclosure Tone (Aggressive or Conservative) 
In the earnings release used in this experiment, positive words were used in the aggressive 
condition and negative in the conservative condition. The manipulation question indirectly 
addressed the tone of the earnings release.9 The participants were asked to assess the Q2 2013 
actual statements on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from very aggressive 1 to very conservative 
7), if they answered 1, 2, or 3 (aggressive), they were asked to indicate why they felt aggressive, 
of if they answered 5, 6, or 7 (conservative) they were asked to indicate why they felt 
conservative. The difference between the conditions was not statistically significant (t value 
1.27; Pr>t 0.10), as participants in the aggressive and conservative conditions rated their 
financial statements as somewhat aggressive (lsmean 3.36 versus 3.00), see Table 4.  
Insert Table 4 Here 
                                                          
9 Future experiments will include manipulation questions that directly address the disclosure tone of the earnings 
release. 
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Although the results of the manipulation check suggest that the manipulation might not have 
been successful, there are reasons to believe that results may be due to the language of the 
manipulation check question. The question was vague and required interpretation, which may 
have led some participants to assess the tone of the financial statements rather than the disclosure 
tone of the earnings release. Since, the participants may not have understood the manipulation 
check question and each participant only saw one version of the video, the lack of or failure of a 
manipulation check does not mean that the results of my tests are not valid. However, my study 
lacks additional support interpreting the cause of the results discussed below; I will continue to 
analyze the results. 
I intend to test the disclosure tone of the earnings release on another group of participants 
who will receive only the earnings release. The survey will include several questions that address 
the participants’ perception of the tone of the earnings release directly (e.g., “Was the language 
used in the earnings release positive or negative?”). In addition, future experiments will include a 
manipulation check question for that directly addresses the disclosure tone of the earnings 
release. 
5.2 Hypothesis Testing: Accuracy 
5.2.1 Research Design: Accuracy  
The experiment employs three manipulated factors: earnings condition (earnings-increasing 
versus earnings-decreasing), media-format condition (video or text), and tone of disclosure 
(aggressive or conservative). Aggressive and conservative are used to describe the “disclosure 
tone” used by the manager in the Q2 2013 earnings release reporting the performance of Sound 
System Co.  
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In order to capture each participant’s criteria for determining a misstatement exists or does 
not exist, I employ the signed distance metric, Ca, (SDT measure of participants’ criterion). A 
positive Ca value indicates a tendency for the participants’ criterion to be extreme (responses 
would be definitely or almost definitely misstated relatively frequently); a zero value indicates a 
tendency for participants’ criterion to be neutral (responses would be probably, possibly, or 
probably not misstated relatively frequently); and, a negative value indicates a tendency for 
participants’ criterion to be lenient (responses would be definitely or almost definitely not 
misstated relatively frequently). 
The 2x4 between-subjects design is shown in Figure 7, Panel B. In both video earnings 
releases, CEO Dave “Poppy” Mason reports earnings using the same words as the matching text 
earnings releases, as shown in Appendices K and L. Participants were instructed to analyze 
Sound Systems Co.’s case information and Q2 2013 actual financial statements to identify 
misstated account balances, provide a confidence level for the assessment, on a seven-point 
Likert scale (1 definitely misstated to 7 definitely not misstated), and estimate the percentage 
misstated. Average accuracy measures (hit, miss, false alarm, correct rejection, and percentage 
correct) and a criterion measure (response bias rating) were recorded for each participant.  
Insert Figure 7 Here 
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5.2.2 Accuracy and Media Format (Video versus Text) 
Hypothesis 1 posits that participants in the video earnings release format condition will be 
less accurate in detecting misstatements than those in the text earnings release condition. To test 
the first hypothesis an ANOVA was prepared with Az individual (SDT accuracy) measure as the 
dependent variable. Hypothesis 1 would be supported if measures of accuracy for participants in 
the video condition were statistically significantly lower than text condition. Table 5 presents the 
ANOVA of Az (individual) results including professional experience. Type III sum of squares is 
appropriate for least-squares means differences and unbalanced groups (Maxwell and Delaney, 
2003). 
Insert Table 5 Here 
Table 6 presents the descriptive data for Az (individual and pooled). In Panel A, Az 
individual was calculated for individual participants using the formula in Figure 6. In Table 6, 
Panel B, Az pooled was calculated using RSCORE-J, which utilizes the jackknife method in 
combination with the RSCORE-II maximization algorithm to compute estimates and their 
standard errors of the ROC parameters of a group ROC under the unequal-variance Gaussian 
model (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). 
Insert Table 6 Here 
The results of testing Az individual differences indicate that there is non-statistically 
significant difference between video (lsmean 0.56) and text (lsmean 0.56) conditions. In the 
ANOVA tests presented in Table 5, media format is not statistically significant (F value 0.02; 
Pr>F 0.89). Tests of pooled Az and an alternative accuracy measure “da” (not tabled) provide 
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similar non-statistically significant results for media format. Participants in the video condition 
did not perform differently than those in the text condition. As a result, I cannot conclude the 
video media format increases cognitive costs and mental effort versus tests in evaluating an 
earnings release for misstated accounts; thus, hypothesis 1 is not supported. 
5.2.3 Accuracy and Disclosure Tone (Aggressive versus Conservative) 
Hypothesis 2a posits participants in the conservative-tone condition will be less accurate in 
detecting misstatements than those in the aggressive-tone condition. Hypothesis 2a would be 
supported if participants in the aggressive condition were more accurate in detecting 
misstatements.  
 The results of testing Az differences for individual participants indicate that there is non-
statistically significant difference between the accuracy of participants in aggressive (lsmean 
0.59) versus conservative (lsmean 0.53) conditions. In the ANOVA results (Table 5), disclosure 
tone is marginally statistically significant (F value 3.29; Pr>F 0.08). When interactions are 
included in the ANOVA for media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition, the 
marginally statistically significant results reported for disclosure tone become non-statistically 
significant, which is also true for ANCOVA tests including all covariates (not tabled).  
The ANOVA results presented in Table 5 do not provide strong support for hypothesis 2a 
and excluding the non-statistically significant interactions eliminates the marginally statistical 
significant support for hypothesis 2a. Participants in the aggressive condition did not perform 
differently than those in the conservative condition. Therefore, I cannot conclude that aggressive 
disclosure-tone will result in participants examining the motivation of management and 
scrutinizing the financial statements more carefully for misstated accounts or that the 
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conservative disclosure-tone in an earnings release is perceived as more credible; thus, 
hypothesis 2a is not supported. 
Hypothesis 2b posits that participants in the video-conservative condition will be less 
accurate in detecting misstatements than those in the text conservative-tone condition. I examine 
the ANCOVA results, which include the interaction between media format and disclosure tone 
(not tabled). The ANCOVA tests do not support hypothesis 2b, as participants in the video-
conservative disclosure tone condition (lsmean 0.55) did not perform differently than participants 
in the text-conservative disclosure tone condition (lsmean 0.51). The interaction of media format 
and disclosure tone is not statistically significant (F value 0.26; Pr>F 0.62). I cannot conclude 
that video enhances the effect of conservative disclosure-tone; thus, hypothesis 2b is not 
supported.  
Hypothesis 2c posits that participants in the video-aggressive condition will be more accurate 
in detecting misstatements than those in the text-aggressive condition. Results of tests do not 
support hypothesis 2c, as participants in the video-aggressive disclosure-tone condition (lsmean 
0.58) did not perform differently than participants in the text-aggressive disclosure-tone 
condition (lsmean 0.60). The ANCOVA test (not tabled) for the interaction of media format and 
disclosure tone is not statistically significant (F value 0.26; Pr>F 0.62); thus, hypothesis 2c is not 
supported. The results of tests on hypotheses 2b and 2c suggest that participants were not 
differentially affected by an interaction between media format and disclosure tone. Additional 
tests examining the hypotheses 2a-2c utilizing alternative SDT measures of accuracy (Az pooled 
and da) (not tabled) provide the same conclusions as discussed for Az individual. 
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5.2.4 Accuracy and Earnings Condition (Earnings-increasing versus -decreasing)  
Hypothesis 3a posits that participants in the earnings-decreasing earnings condition will be 
less accurate in detecting misstatements than those in the earnings-increasing condition. The 
results of testing Az differences for individual participants indicate a statistically significant 
difference between earnings-increasing (lsmean 0.61) and -decreasing (lsmean 0.53) conditions, 
(F value 6.27; Pr>F .02). The ANOVA tests support hypothesis 3a; that is, participants in the 
earnings-increasing condition were more accurate in detecting misstatements than those in the 
earnings-decreasing condition. 
As shown in Table 6, Panel B, participants in the earnings-increasing condition were better 
able to detect misstatements (lsmean 0.61) versus those in the earnings-decreasing condition 
(lsmean 0.53). Participants were more accurate in detecting misstatements in all earnings-
increasing conditions versus the earnings-decreasing conditions; thus, hypothesis 3a is supported. 
The descriptive data suggest that participants were motivated to detect misstatements when the 
misstatement appeared to be earnings-increasing, which is consistent with participants perceiving 
earnings-increasing misstatements as a greater risk than earnings-decreasing misstatements.  
Hypothesis 3b posits participants in the earnings-decreasing condition will exhibit smaller 
differences in the detection of misstatements between the media formats (video or text) than the 
earnings-increasing condition. The ANOVA test of the interaction between media format and 
earnings condition (not tabled) is not statistically significant (F value 1.16; Pr>F 0.29). An F test 
of contrasts between factors with the interaction is also not statistically significant (F value 0.48; 
Pr>F 0.63). I expected video media-format to increase participants’ awareness of managements’ 
incentives to increase earnings and perceive the related risks of inflated earnings as greater than 
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managements’ incentives to decrease earnings and the related risk of deflated earnings; however, 
media format does not differentially affect earnings condition. 
Table 6, Panel A, shows the difference between video earnings-increasing (lsmean 0.60) and 
video earnings-decreasing (lsmean 0.53) condition is 0.07, not statistically significantly different. 
The difference between text earnings-increasing (lsmean 0.63) versus text earnings-decreasing 
(lsmean 0.48) is 0.15, statistically significantly different. The size of the differences in the two 
conditions is not statistically significant and the difference between the contrasts is opposite what 
I hypothesized; thus, hypothesis 3b is not supported. 
Panel B, Table 6, reports similar results for Az pooled; participants’ in the video earnings-
increasing condition had a non-statistically significant difference of 0.08 versus the video 
earnings-decreasing condition (lsmeans 0.59 versus 0.51, respectively). In addition, participants 
in the text earnings-increasing condition had a non-statistically significant difference of 0.08 
versus participants in the text earnings-decreasing condition (lsmean 0.62 versus 0.54, 
respectively). As in Panel A, the differences between earnings-increasing and –decreasing 
conditions are in the hypothesized direction for disclosure tone and earnings condition, but not 
media format. The results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the interaction of media format does not 
differentially affect earnings conditions; thus, hypothesis 3b is not supported. 
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5.3 Hypothesis Testing: Participants’ Criterion 
5.3.1 Research Design: Participants’ Criterion 
The relation between Ca and a participant's categorization in assessing misstatements allows 
me to interpret misstatement criteria. The Likert scale used in my experiment ranges from 1 
(definitely misstated) to 7 (definitely not misstated). I obtain up to six values for Ca for each 
participant (one minus the number of categories). The number of values for Ca is dependent on 
the participant’s variation in categorizing their confidence responses. A participant that exhibits 
greater variation in confidence responses will allow for measurement of six values, while 
participants with less variation will have as few as three measures.  
Positive values happen when the hit rate is smaller than the rate of correct rejections. A 
positive Ca value indicates a tendency for that criterion to be conservative (participant reports 
“definitely not misstated” relatively frequently), a zero value indicates a tendency for that 
criterion to be neutral (participant reports “possibly misstated” relatively frequently), and a 
negative value indicates a tendency for that criterion to be liberal (participant reports “definitely 
misstated” relatively frequently) (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). 
Participants who frequently rate accounts in the extreme categories of the Likert scale are 
assumed to have a lower criterion for misstatements than participants who frequently rate 
accounts in the middle categories. The Ca for a participant who frequently rates accounts in the 
extreme categories will be smaller in absolute value (average across decision criteria) than for a 
participant who frequently rates accounts in the middle categories (the middle categories indicate 
uncertainty); thus, participants who have larger Ca values have higher criteria for misstatement 
than those with smaller Ca values. 
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5.3.2 Participants’ Criterion and Media Format (Video versus Text) 
Hypothesis 4a posits that participants in the video condition will have a higher criterion for 
their account assessments than those in the text condition. To test this hypothesis an ANOVA 
was prepared with Ca (SDT participants’ criterion) measure as the dependent variable, see Table 
7. Hypothesis 4a would be supported if least-squares means for criterion Ca were statistically 
significantly higher in the video condition than the text condition. Table 8 presents the 
descriptive data for Ca (SDT participants’ criterion). ANCOVA tests (not tabled) do not change 
the statistical significance of the results discussed below. 
Insert Tables 7 and 8 Here 
Tables 7 and 8 show there is a statistically significant difference in Ca between the video 
media-format condition (lsmean 0.26) and the text media-format condition (lsmean 0.06) at less 
than five percent (F value 6.19; Pr>F 0.02). Participants in the video condition reported possibly 
misstated more frequently than more extreme intervals (definitely misstated/not misstated) 
versus participants in the text condition. Taken together ANOVA tests in Tables 7 and 
descriptive data in Table 8 support hypothesis 4a. It appears that the video media format 
motivated participants’ to consider additional factors (i.e., CEO Poppy Mason’s personal 
characteristics, quality of presentation, or future projections) in assessing confidence in their 
account assessment decisions. 
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5.3.3 Participants’ Criterion and Disclosure Tone (Aggressive versus Conservative) 
Hypothesis 4b posits participants in the aggressive-tone condition will have a lower criterion 
for their account assessments than those in the conservative-tone condition. Hypothesis 4b would 
be supported if least-squares means for participants in the aggressive-tone condition were smaller 
than participants in the conservative-tone condition.  
 As shown in Tables 7 and 8, there is a non-statistically significant difference between 
aggressive (lsmean 0.13) and (lsmean 0.16) conservative condition (F value 0.36; Pr>F 0.55). 
The ANOVA tests do not support hypothesis 4b, as participants in the aggressive condition did 
not perform differently than those in the conservative condition. Based on the tests in Tables 7 
and 8, hypothesis 4b, is not supported, the effect of disclosure tone did not affect participants’ 
criterion. 
5.3.4 Participants’ Criterion and Earnings Condition (Earnings-increasing versus -decreasing) 
Hypothesis 4c: Participants in the earnings-increasing condition will have a lower criterion 
for their account assessments than those in the earnings-decreasing condition. Hypothesis 4c 
would be supported if least-squares means for participants in the earnings-increasing condition 
were smaller than participants in the earnings-decreasing condition.  
 The difference between earnings-increasing and -decreasing conditions presented in Tables 
7 and 8, show earnings condition is not statistically significant (F value 0.45; Pr>F 0.5045). 
Descriptive data in Table 8 supports the results in Table 7, as the difference between earnings-
increasing (lsmean 0.16) and earnings-decreasing conditions (lsmean 0.13) of 0.03 is non-
statistically significant in the opposite direction hypothesized; thus, hypothesis 4c is not 
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supported. The effect of earnings condition did not affect participants’ criterion for their account 
assessments. 
5.4 Non-SDT Measure of Accuracy: Percentage Correct 
Ramsey and Tubbs (2005) note that PC (percentage correct), an alternative non-SDT 
measure that has been used in prior accounting literature. They show that PC fails to control for a 
participants’ criterion in measuring accuracy. I present PC for purposes of comparing the 
consistency of my findings to Ramsay and Tubbs (2005) and Sprinkle and Tubbs (1998). The 
descriptive data for PC are shown in Table 10. The mean accuracy for the video condition 
(lsmean 0.63) is not statistically significantly different than the text condition (lsmean 0.61). 
Video earnings-increasing (lsmean 0.66) and earnings-decreasing (lsmean 0.61) conditions were 
both not statistically significantly different than the text earnings conditions (lsmeans 0.63 and 
0.58, respectively). Video aggressive condition (lsmean 0.62) was not statistically significantly 
different than the text aggressive condition (lsmean 0.65). These results are consistent with the 
ANOVA tests presented in Table 9, as media format is not statistically significant (F value 0.07; 
Pr>F 0.4162), and earnings condition is only marginally statistically significant (F value 3.00; 
Pr>F 0.09).  
Insert Tables 9 and 10 Here 
Tests presented for PC are consistent with those presented in Section 5 for Az, except PC 
means are generally larger than Az (not statistically tested), since the difference between Az and 
PC is not the focus of my study. Finding PC means larger than Az is not unexpected, since my 
experiment has a smaller number of accounts that are misstated versus not misstated, and 
participants judged the majority of accounts to be not misstated. As a result, the PC was higher 
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than Az, because PC does not control for participants’ criterion for determining a misstatement 
exists (Sprinkle and Tubbs, 1998; Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005). 
6. Analysis of Potential Alternative Explanations 
6.1. Professional versus Nonprofessional Financial Statement Users 
Prior research on financial statement user decision-making shows professional financial 
statement users approach investment decisions in a systematic manner (Hodge and Pronk, 2006). 
They obtain, analyze, and integrate financial information differently than nonprofessional 
financial statement users (Elliot, Hodge, and Jackson, 2008), they do not linearly process 
information (Hirst and Hopkins, 1998), and will skip over information they deem irrelevant 
(Maines and McDaniel, 2000).  
Professional financial statement users are not immune to biases; Libby et al. (2002), examine 
prior literature and find that analysts’ forecasts are systematically biased and exhibit fixation on 
certain accounting balances (e.g., net earnings, sales), a form of functional fixation.10 They 
contend that the complexity of financial statement analysis and limited cognitive resources 
causes analysts to selectively acquire information. Maines and McDaniel (2000) pointed out in 
Hirst and Hopkins’ (1998), comprehensive earnings were not utilized by analysts, because 
comprehensive earnings is not decision relevant information for manufacturing firms. They 
contend that this is consistent with professional financial statement users ignoring information 
they deem not relevant. The results above suggest that professional financial statement users 
develop models of valuation and do not acquire information that is not included in their model.  
                                                          
10 Ashton (1976) suggests functional fixation is a condition that a decision maker might be unable to change a 
decision in response to a change in the accounting process that supplied data, because of prior utilization of the data 
in a different way. 
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Table 5 presents the ANOVA tests for Az individual (SDT accuracy) including experience. 
The results indicate that experience is a statistically significant factor in detecting misstatements 
(F value 3.32; Pr>F 0.01) at less than five percent. Least-squares means shown in Table 11, 
Panel A, confirm that least-squares means for accuracy increase monotonically from 0.55 to 0.73 
as professional experience increases (1 = internship; 2 = 1 to 2 years; 3 = 3 to 4 years; 4 = 5 to 8 
years; 5 = 9+ years; 6 = prefer not to answer). Tests presented in Table 11, Panel B, show test 
statistics contrasting groups by professional experience and indicate a non-statistically significant 
difference between groups (Table 11 excludes participants who preferred not to answer). My 
findings are consistent with research documenting experience as a factor affecting financial 
statement analysis (Clements and Wolfe, 1999). 
Insert Table 11 here 
Tests examining the effect of experience on Ca (Table 7), demonstrate that professional 
experience is not a statistically significant determinant of participants’ criterion. ANCOVA test 
results for Ca (not tabled) including control variables did not change the statistical significance 
of the findings presented in Section 5.3.  
6.2. Order of Presentation of Materials 
Many studies recognize that the order of presentation affects judgment and decision-making 
(e.g., Bamber et al., 1997; Baird and Zelin, 2000; Mertins and Long, 2012). They note that 
primacy and recency have been shown to bias the decision-making process, especially when 
there are different levels of effort exhibited. In my experiment, the earnings release (video or 
text) is presented prior to the financial statements in order to maximize the effect of media 
format and disclosure tone, and increase external validity. In practice, it is likely financial 
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statement users would view the earnings release prior to performing a detailed review of the 
financial statements. Additionally, there is no reason to suspect that there will be differences in 
variation in the effort of the participants in this study. Therefore, the earnings release (video or 
text) is presented at the beginning of the financial materials in all cases. 
6.3. Trust in and Likeability of the Manager 
EHS (2012) find that trust and likeability of managers affect financial statement users’ 
decision-making, mitigating the effect of media format. In addition, financial statement users 
condition their earnings predictions on their opinion of management’s credibility (Hirst et al., 
1999). These studies suggest that trust and likeability are important qualities in an executive and 
may affect participants’ ability to detect misstatements. In order to control for trust and 
likeability, participants’ were asked to assess the likeability and trust of CEO Poppy Mason.  
ANCOVA tests including participants’ trust and likability (not tabled) assessments do not 
change the statistical significance of results presented in Section 5. Trust and likability were non-
statistically significant determinants of accuracy in misstatement detection (trust: F Value 1.54; 
Pr>F 0.22; likeability: F Value 0.44; Pr>F 0.51). Tests examining the effect of trust and likability 
on Ca result in marginally significant differences for media format (F Value 3.57; Pr>F 0.07), 
which is a decrease in statistical significance versus results presented in Table 7. The change 
appears to be due to a reduction in power of the test, because neither trust nor likability are 
statistically significant determinants of participants’ criterion (trust: F Value 0.45; Pr>F 0.51; 
likeability: F Value 0.79; Pr>F 0.39). The exclusion of trust and likeability in tests above do not 
affect the significance of the results presented above except as noted.  
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6.4. Familiarity with Task 
Carlson and George (2004)11 report that a participant’s level of familiarity with the task is 
likely to affect participants’ decision-making. In my study, ANCOVA tests examining the results 
include demographic information (e.g., accounting and finance courses, investment experience, 
professional work experience) to control for task familiarity. Participants with greater investment 
experience and more accounting, auditing, and finance courses are expected to have greater 
familiarity with the task. As noted above, experience is a statistically significant factor in 
detecting misstatements; however, accounting and finance courses, and investment experience 
were non-statistically significant in ANCOVA tests. 
6.5. Other Alternative Explanations  
Additional factors not discussed may affect the detection of misstatements such as the 
technology utilized to search for information (Hodge, Kennedy, and Maines, 2004) and 
participants’ learning style (Clements and Wolfe 1997). My experiment relies on randomization 
to control for alternative explanations and user technology. ANCOVA tests examining additional 
covariates including: comfort with computers; learning style; age; gender; emotional state; and 
CEO gender preference did not produce results that were statistically significantly different than 
those presented in Section 5.  
  
                                                          
11 Carlson and George (2004) also find evidence that familiarity with managers also affects participants’ decision-
making, but that is not relevant to my study, as the participants do not know the CEO and Sound Systems Co. is a 
fictitious company.  
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7. Conclusion, Potential Limitations, and Motivation for Further Investigation 
7.1. Conclusions 
I examine whether media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition affect participants’ 
ability to detect misstatements as a proxy for participant decision-making quality. I find that 
earnings condition affected participants’ detection of misstated accounts. Participants in the 
earnings-increasing condition were statistically significantly more accurate in detecting misstated 
accounts than participants in the earnings-decreasing condition. This is consistent with 
participants perceiving earnings-increasing misstatements as a greater risk than earnings-
decreasing misstatements. This is a potentially important finding suggesting that the substance of 
the disclosure is more important to financial statement users than the media format or disclosure 
tone in detecting misstatements. 
I also find participants in the aggressive disclosure-tone condition were marginally more 
accurate in detecting misstated accounts than participants in the conservative disclosure-tone 
condition; however, this was not robust to the inclusion of control variables; thus, I could not 
conclude that disclosure-tone affects the detection of misstatements. This finding provides 
motivation for further investigation, because my tests lacked statistical power due to the less than 
optimal sample size. Further examination of the effect of disclosure tone on participants’ 
decision-making, may provide insight into findings from archival research that disclosure tone is 
incremental in explaining market returns controlling for performance (Henry, 2008). 
I did not find differences in accuracy of detecting misstatements between media-format 
conditions (video versus text). My results are consistent with research documenting factors that 
mediate the effect of media format on financial statement users’ decision-making (e.g., 
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“systematic processing” Clements and Wolfe, 2000; “trust” Elliott, Hodge, and Sedor, 2012). 
Additional data collection may provide statistical power to support or contest my finding that 
media format does not affect the detection of misstated accounts.  
I also examine the effect of media format, disclosure tone, and earnings condition on the 
participants’ threshold for signaling a misstatement exists. I find that participants in the video 
condition exhibit higher thresholds to report a misstatement exists versus the participants in the 
text condition. Participants who viewed the video earnings-release were less likely to rate 
accounts as definitely or almost definitely misstated/not misstated than participants in the text 
condition. This is consistent with prior research documenting that video media format enhances 
presenter’s characteristics (EHS, 2012). Participants in my experiment agreed on average that 
CEO Poppy Mason was likeable and trustworthy, which may have influenced them to increase 
their criterion for reporting an account as misstated. Neither disclosure tone nor earnings 
condition affected participants’ criterion; therefore, my findings are consistent with prior 
research documenting that video affects participants’ emotive processing of information 
(Clements and Wolfe, 1997; EHS, 2012). Taken together the results suggest that participants 
value the characteristics of the person making the presentation and their emotive responses affect 
their criterion for their account assessments. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study investigating the effect of media format, disclosure 
tone, and earnings condition on decision-making quality (misstatement detection). The results of 
my research demonstrate that earnings condition dominates financial statement user decision-
making in detecting misstatements; however, despite my less than optimal sample, I believe my 
findings provide motivation to continue the investigation of my research questions through 
additional experiments.  
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7.2. Potential Limitations 
My research has a few limitations: first, I recruited MSA, MBA and EMBA students to 
voluntarily participate; however, my response and completion rates were low. In addition, 
participant responses were discarded for unusually short completion times (less than 15 minutes 
and little or no variation in their responses) or incomplete responses (experiment times greater 
than one day). Additional tests including these participants did change the statistical significance 
of the results reported in Section 5, as all variables become non-statistically significant. This is 
likely due to the decrease in variation in accuracy as participants’ who quickly completed the 
experiment had little or no variation in their responses (i.e., participants selected all 2s or 3s).  
The number of lost observations resulted in unequal cell sizes, a less than optimal sample 
size, and low statistical power. I plan to gather additional data using extra credit as a motivation, 
since this was the most effective incentive. If necessary, additional participants will be recruited 
through a pay service such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Second, my experimental task may not be a realistic financial analysis decision-making 
scenario. The task utilizes materials tested with auditors in Biggs and Wright (1995, workpaper) 
and is utilized in an intermediate course, but may not reflect the same materials used by financial 
analysts in practice. Additional testing of experimental materials is planned prior to recruiting 
additional participants.  
Third, participants may not be representative of financial statement users in practice; 
however, graduate students have been shown to be appropriate surrogates for nonprofessional 
financial statement users (Elliott et al., 2007). Fourth, the studies discussed above in Section 3.1, 
suggest there are two strategies that financial statement users can employ to reduce the cognitive 
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load increase video can present. My experiment allows users to 1) replay, or 2) stop, analyze, and 
restart the video as can be done in practice. If participants employed these strategies, then it may 
explain why I did not find statistically significant differences in between video and text. I was 
not able to track time spent on analyzing the earnings release, though in future experiments if the 
technology allows, viewing time and activity will be tracked.  
7.3 Motivation for Further Investigation 
ANOVA and ANCOVA are the appropriate methods to test my hypotheses; however, the 
less than optimal sample size produces a lack of power. Additional data gathering is planned for 
the spring semester of 2015 at two state universities, one in New England and one in the Mid-
western U.S. The analysis presented below is to discuss potentially interesting findings; 
however, the results presented lack controls for other possible explanations; thus, are not 
intended to test any hypotheses presented. 
7.3.1 Accuracy and Media format 
As shown in Panel A of Table 6, the least-squares means Az individual (SDT accuracy) for 
video condition is 0.56 versus 0.56 for text condition, a non-statistically significant difference. 
Least-squares means for the video aggressive and video earnings-increasing condition were all 
less accurate than least-squares means for the respective text condition (0.02 and 0.03, 
respectively) in the direction hypothesized, but were not statistically significantly different. In 
the video conservative and video earnings-decreasing condition the difference between video and 
text are in the opposite direction (lsmean 0.04 and 0.05, respectively), but again are not 
statistically significantly different.  
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Tests of least-squares means presented in Panel A, suffer from a lack of statistical power. 
Additional participant observations would allow analysis using RSCORE-J and offer greater 
statistical validity as in Panel B, Table 6 pooled least-squares mean estimates provide increased 
power for less than optimal sample sizes and produces statistics with reduced bias (Dorfman and 
Berbaum, 1986). Consistent with hypothesis 1, participants in each of the video condition were 
less accurate than participants in the corresponding text condition. The results suggest that the 
collection of additional data may be a worthwhile endeavor.  
7.3.2 Accuracy and Disclosure Tone 
All comparisons between the accuracy of participants in the aggressive condition versus the 
conservative condition shown in Table 6, are in the predicted direction, but non-statistically 
significant. The descriptive data suggests that the collection of additional data may improve 
statistical significance.  
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Appendix A: Unadjusted Financial Statements (Biggs and Wright, 1995 workpaper) 
 
  
1995 1994 1993
UNAUDITED % assets AUDITED % assets AUDITED % assets
BALANCE SHEETS
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 14,553$          13.5% 21,636$          22.7% 21,183$          26.7%
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, NET 30,654            28.5% 25,922            27.3% 23,122            29.1%
INVENTORY, NET 18,380            17.1% 15,750            16.6% 13,029            16.4%
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 63,587            59.1% 63,308            66.6% 57,334            72.2%
LONG-TERM ASSETS
PROPERTY, PLANT, & EQUIPMENT 45,230            42.0% 33,652            35.4% 22,779            28.7%
ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION (4,975)             -4.6% (3,702)             -3.9% (2,506)             -3.2%
INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 3,779               3.5% 1,866               2.0% 1,790               2.3%
TOTAL LONG-TERM ASSETS 44,034            40.9% 31,816            33.4% 22,063            27.8%
TOTAL ASSETS 107,621$        100.0% 95,124$          100.0% 79,397$          100.0%
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 11,114$          10.3% 10,530$          11.1% 8,732$            11.0%
OTHER SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES 7,464               6.9% 7,619               8.0% 6,337               8.0%
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 18,578            17.3% 18,149            19.1% 15,069            19.0%
TOTAL LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2,381               2.2% 2,512               2.6% 2,394               3.0%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 20,959            19.5% 20,661            21.7% 17,463            22.0%
EQUITY
COMMON STOCK 18,832            17.5% 18,832            19.8% 18,832            23.7%
RETAINED EARNINGS 67,830            63.0% 55,631            58.5% 43,102            54.3%
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY 86,662            80.5% 74,463            78.3% 61,934            78.0%
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 107,621$        100.0% 95,124$          100.0% 79,397$          100.0%
EARNINGS STATEMENTS % sales % sales % sales
SALES, NET 124,420$        100.0% 114,754$        100.0% 93,894$          100.0%
COST OF SALES 59,419            47.8% 54,683            47.7% 45,139            48.1%
GROSS MARGIN 65,001            52.2% 60,071            52.3% 48,755            51.9%
SELLING, GENERAL, ADMIN AND OTHER 47,285            38.0% 42,663            37.2% 31,865            33.9%
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES 17,716            14.2% 17,408            15.2% 16,890            18.0%
INTEREST EXPENSE -                   -                   -                   
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES 17,716            14.2% 17,408            15.2% 16,890            18.0%
TAX ON EARNINGS 35% 4,429               3.6% 4,352               3.8% 4,223               4.5%
NET EARNINGS 13,287$          10.7% 13,056$          11.4% 12,668$          13.5%
EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) 0.71$               0.69$               0.67$               
SELLING, GENERAL, ADMIN, & OTHER DETAIL
SELLING 17,628$          14.2% 14,303$          12.5% 9,796$            10.4%
ADMINISTRATIVE 27,791            22.3% 25,465            22.2% 19,792            21.1%
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT -                   0.0% -                   0.0% -                   0.0%
WARRANTY 1,866               1.5% 2,895               2.5% 2,277               2.4%
TOTAL S,G,A,&O 47,285$          38.0% 42,663$          37.2% 31,865$          33.9%
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Appendix A, continued: Unadjusted Financial Statements (Biggs and Wright, 1995 
workpaper) 
Changes to Unadjusted Financial Statements 
The financials have been adjusted to create a “no manipulation” (correct) set of statements both 
projected and actual (unaudited), (see Appendix B).  
Balances and figures for: 
 1995 were modified to create Q2 2013 Actual  
 1994 were modified to create Q2 2013 Projected 
 1994 were modified to create Q1 2013 Actual 
 1993 were modified to create Q4 2012 (not provided to participants) 
 
1. Changes made to all statements:  
1.1. Changed presentation from “annual” to “quarterly” 
1.2. Moved “allowance for accounts receivable” off of the face of the financials to the AR 
footnote 
1.3. Added “allowance for sales returns” to AR footnote (grosses up AR) to allow for Sales 
misstatement 
1.4. Added “, NET” to the following accounts: AR, Inventory, and Sales. Details provided in 
notes to FS  
1.5. Changed “deferred tooling cost” to “intangible assets, net” 
1.6. Changed “SG&A” to “SGA&O” (other) 
1.7. Added “interest expense” 
1.8. Added “research and development” as part of SGA&O 
1.9. Changed the tax rate from 25% to 35% to reflect current federal tax rate 
1.10. Used this following table to create cash flow information: 
 
Cash Flow Statement 
net earnings 
depreciation expense (diff accum dep) 
amortization expense(intangibles amort from FN) 
change in accounts receivable 
change in inventory 
change in accounts payable 
change in other liabilities 
cash flow from operations 
cash flow from investing (change in PPE) 
cash flow from financing (PLUG) 
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Appendix B: Details and Financial Statements: Not Manipulated 
 
1995 Q2 2013 Q2 ACTUAL V 1995 Q2 2013 1994 Q1 2013 1993 Q4 2012
UNAUDITED ACTUAL $ change PROJECTED $ change % change AUDITED ACTUAL $ change AUDITED ACTUAL
BALANCE SHEETS
ASSETS
CURRENT ASSETS
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 14,553$        14,553$    -          14,900$      (347)       -2.3% 21,636$    21,636$    -          21,183$ 23,061$ 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, NET 30,654          30,654      -          30,100        554         1.8% 25,922      25,692      (230)       23,122    20,827    
INVENTORY, NET 18,380          18,380      -          17,500        880         5.0% 15,750      15,750      -          13,029    13,029    
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 63,587          63,587      -          62,500        1,087     1.7% 63,308      63,078      (230)       57,334    56,917    
LONG-TERM ASSETS
PROPERTY, PLANT, & EQUIPMENT 45,230          41,730      (3,500)    41,100        630         1.5% 33,652      33,652      -          22,779    22,779    
ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION (4,975)           (4,975)       -          (5,200)         225         -4.3% (3,702)       (3,702)       -          (2,506)    (2,506)    
INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 3,779            3,779        -          4,400          (621)       -14.1% 1,866        1,866        -          1,790      1,790      
TOTAL LONG-TERM ASSETS 44,034          40,534      (3,500)    40,300        234         0.6% 31,816      31,816      -          22,063    22,063    
TOTAL ASSETS 107,621$     104,121$ (3,500)    102,800$   1,321     1.3% 95,124$    94,894$    (230)       79,397$ 78,980$ 
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 11,114$        11,114$    -          10,928$      186         1.7% 10,530$    10,530$    -          8,732$    8,732$    
OTHER SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES 7,464            9,077        1,613     8,195          882         10.8% 7,619        9,703        2,084     6,337      6,337      
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 18,578          20,191      1,613     19,123        1,068     5.6% 18,149      20,233      2,084     15,069    15,069    
TOTAL LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2,381            2,381        -          2,022          359         17.8% 2,512        2,512        -          2,394      2,394      
TOTAL LIABILITIES 20,959          22,572      1,613     21,145        1,427     6.7% 20,661      22,745      2,084     17,463    17,463    
EQUITY
COMMON STOCK 18,832          18,832      -          18,832        -          0.0% 18,832      18,832      -          18,832    18,832    
RETAINED EARNINGS 67,830          62,717      (5,113)    62,823        (106)       -0.2% 55,631      53,317      (2,314)    43,102    42,685    
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY 86,662          81,549      (5,113)    81,655        (106)       -0.1% 74,463      72,149      (2,314)    61,934    61,517    
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 107,621$     104,121$ (3,500)    102,800$   1,321     1.3% 95,124$    94,894$    (230)       79,397$ 78,980$ 
-                 -             -               -             -             -          -          
EARNINGS STATEMENTS
SALES, NET 124,420$     124,420$ -          124,015$   405         0.3% 114,754$ 112,954$ (1,800)    93,894$ 93,894$ 
COST OF SALES 59,419          59,419      -          58,964        455         0.8% 54,683      54,599      (84)          45,139    45,139    
GROSS MARGIN 65,001          65,001      -          65,051        (50)          -0.1% 60,071      58,355      (1,716)    48,755    48,755    
SELLING, GENERAL, ADMIN AND OTHER 47,285          47,285      -          47,140        145         0.3% 42,663      42,320      (343)       31,865    31,865    
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES 17,716          17,716      -          17,911        (195)       -1.1% 17,408      16,035      (1,373)    16,890    16,890    
INTEREST EXPENSE -                 357            357         389              (32)          -8.2% -             319            319         -          215          
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES 17,716          17,359      (357)       17,522        (163)       -0.9% 17,408      15,716      (1,692)    16,890    16,675    
TAX ON EARNINGS 35% 4,429            6,076        1,647     6,133          (57)          -0.9% 4,352        5,501        1,149     4,223      5,836      
NET EARNINGS 13,287$        11,283$    (2,004)    11,389$      (106)       -0.9% 13,056$    10,215$    (2,841)    12,668$ 10,839$ 
EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) 0.71$            0.60$        (0.11)      0.60$          -          0.0% 0.69$        0.54$        (0.15)      0.67$      0.58$      
SELLING, GENERAL, ADMIN, & OTHER DETAIL
SELLING 17,628$        17,628$    -          17,281$      347         2.0% 14,303$    14,303$    -          9,796$    8,203$    
ADMINISTRATIVE 27,791          25,871      (1,920)    25,467        404         1.6% 25,465      23,124      (2,341)    19,792    19,792    
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT -                 1,920        1,920     2,577          (657)       -25.5% -             1,998        1,998     -          1,593      
WARRANTY 1,866            1,866        -          1,815          51           2.8% 2,895        2,895        -          2,277      2,277      
TOTAL S,G,A,&O 47,285$        47,285$    -          47,140$      145         0.3% 42,663$    42,320$    (343)       31,865$ 31,865$ 
PROJ V ACTUAL
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Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTED
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual
BALANCE SHEETS
CURRENT ASSETS
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 14,553$      14,900$          -2.3% 21,636       -32.7%
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, NET 30,654        30,100            1.8% 25,692       19.3%
INVENTORY, NET 18,380        17,500            5.0% 15,750       16.7%
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 63,587        62,500            1.7% 63,078       0.8%
LONG-TERM ASSETS
PROPERTY, PLANT, & EQUIPMENT 41,730        41,100            1.5% 33,652       24.0%
ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION (4,975)         (5,200)             -4.3% (3,702)        34.4%
INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 3,779           4,400              -14.1% 1,866          102.5%
TOTAL LONG-TERM ASSETS 40,534        40,300            0.6% 31,816       27.4%
TOTAL ASSETS 104,121$    102,800$       1.3% 94,894       9.7%
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 11,114$      10,928$          1.7% 10,530       5.5%
OTHER SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES 9,077           8,195              10.8% 9,703          -6.5%
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 20,191        19,123            5.6% 20,233       -0.2%
TOTAL LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2,381           2,022              17.8% 2,512          -5.2%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 22,572        21,145            6.7% 22,745       -0.8%
EQUITY
COMMON STOCK 18,832        18,832            0.0% 18,832       0.0%
RETAINED EARNINGS 62,717        62,823            -0.2% 53,317       17.6%
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY 81,549        81,655            -0.1% 72,149       13.0%
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 104,121$    102,800$       1.3% 94,894       9.7%
 Q2 - 
ACTUAL 
 Q2 - 
PROJECTED 
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
 Q1 - 
ACTUAL 
 Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual 
SALES, NET 124,420$    124,015$       0.3% 112,954     10.2%
COST OF SALES 59,419        58,964            0.8% 54,599       8.8%
GROSS MARGIN 65,001        65,051            -0.1% 58,355       11.4%
SELLING, GENERAL, ADMINSTRATIVE AND OTHER 47,285        47,140            0.3% 42,320       11.7%
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES 17,716        17,911            -1.1% 16,035       10.5%
INTEREST EXPENSE 357              389                  -8.2% 319             11.9%
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES 17,359        17,522            -0.9% 15,716       10.5%
TAX ON EARNINGS 35% 6,076           6,133              -0.9% 5,501          10.5%
NET EARNINGS 11,283$      11,389$          -0.9% 10,215       10.5%
EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) 0.60$           0.60$              0.0% 0.54            11.1%
SELLING, GENERAL, AMINISTRATIVE, AND OTHER DETAIL
SELLING 17,628        17,281            2.0% 14,303       23.2%
ADMINISTRATIVE 25,871        25,467            1.6% 23,124       11.9%
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1,920           2,577              -25.5% 1,998          -3.9%
WARRANTY 1,866           1,815              2.8% 2,895          -35.5%
TOTAL S,G,A,&O 47,285        47,140            0.3% 42,320       11.7%
 Q2 - 
ACTUAL 
 Q2 - 
PROJECTED 
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
 Q1 - 
ACTUAL 
Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES 4,985$        5,622$            -11.3% 10,870       -54.1%
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES (8,078)         (7,448)             8.5% (10,873)      -25.7%
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES (3,990)         (4,910)             -18.7% 456             -975.0%
NET CHANGE IN CASH FLOWS (7,083)         (6,736)             5.2% 453             -1663.6%
CASH AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD 21,636        21,636            0.0% 21,183       2.1%
CASH AT END OF PERIOD 14,553$      14,900$          -2.3% 21,636       -32.7%
EARNINGS STATEMENTS
CASH FLOWS STATEMENTS
APPENDIX B, continued
CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS
SOUND SYSTEM CO.
2013 CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
($ THOUSANDS EXCEPT EPS)
(UNAUDITED AND SUBJECT TO RECLASSIFICATION)
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APPENDIX B, continued
LIQUIDITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
CURRENT RATIO = TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS/TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 3.15          3.27           3.12          
QUICK RATIO = (TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS - INVENTORY)/TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 2.24          2.35           2.34          
ALLOWANCE FOR UNCOLLECTABLE ACCOUNTS AS A PERCENT OF ACCOUNTS 
RECEIVABLE, NET = (AR ALLOWANCE/NET AR) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
CASH TO TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES = CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS/TOTAL 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 0.72          0.78           1.07          
ACTIVITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
RECEIVABLES TURNOVER (CREDIT SALES/AVERAGE NET AR) 2.38          2.48           2.68          
INVENTORIES TURNOVER (COS/AVG NET INVENTORY) 3.48          3.55           3.79          
ASSET TURNOVER (NET SALES/NET PP&E) 3.39          3.45           3.77          
PROFITABILITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
SALES RETURNS AND ALLOWANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET SALES 17.5% 18.6% 22.8%
COST OF SALES AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 47.8% 47.5% 48.3%
GROSS MARGIN PERCENT OF NET SALES 52.2% 52.5% 51.7%
SGA&O AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 38.0% 38.0% 37.5%
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 14.2% 14.4% 14.2%
NET EARNINGS AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 9.1% 9.2% 9.0%
RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS (NET EARNINGS/(AVERAGE ASSETS) 11.34% 11.52% 10.76%
RETURN ON AVERAGE EQUITY (NET EARNINGS/(AVERAGE STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY) 16.73% 16.88% 16.28%
COVERAGE
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES TO TOTAL ASSETS 2.29% 1.97% 2.65%
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES TO EQUITY 2.92% 2.48% 3.48%
TIMES INTEREST EARNED (EBIT/INTEREST EXPENSE) 49.62        46.04         50.27        
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATIONS TO LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2.09          2.78           4.33          
INVESTMENT VALUATION RATIOS
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE (EPS) 0.60$        0.60$         0.54$        
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE TO EPS RATIO 41.67        32.08         27.78        
BOOK VALUE PER COMMON SHARE (TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY/COMMON 
STOCK) 4.33$        4.34$         3.83$        
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE PER BOOK VALUE PER COMMON SHARE (STOCK 
PRICE PER SHARE/ BOOK VALUE PER SHARE) 5.77$        4.44$         3.92$        
NOTES TO 2013 FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
PERCENT OF SALES ON CREDIT 54.0% 55.7% 57.5%
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE LAST TRADING DAY OF QUARTER 25.00$     19.25$       15.00$     
DIVIDENDS PER COMMON SHARE 0.10$        0.10$         -$          
SOUND SYSTEM CO.
Q2 2013 FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS
PREPARED BY MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
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Appendix C: Details and Financial Statements: Earnings-decreasing Manipulation 
 
Original Case - Earnings Decreasing Manipulations (in thousands)
APPENDIX C
1 Cost of sales and inventory manipulation 
This is the entry that SHOULD have been applied
debit Inventory 3,320                       
COS 1,680                       
credit MOH 5,000                    
This is the misstated entry that was recorded instead of above
Debit COS 3,320                       
Inventory 1,680                       
credit MOH 5,000                    
misstatement 1,640                       effect on cost of sales
Effect of misstatement on balances/figures Manipulated Unmanipulated $ chg % chg
COS overstated 61,059                  59,419                    1,640   2.8%
Inventory understated 16,740                  18,380                    (1,640) -8.9%
Other short-term liabilities understated 8,503                    9,077                       (574)     -6.3%
Accounts Excluded from their analysis
Total Current Assets understated (TA under too) 61,947                  63,587                    (1,640) -2.6%
Total Current Liabilities understated (TL under too) 19,617                  20,191                    (574)     -2.8%
Retained earnings understated 61,651                  62,717                    (1,066) -1.7%
Tax expense understated 5,502                    6,076                       (574)     -9.4%
All earnings measures understated
unmanipulated manipulated this manip projected manip v projected
Earnings before Int & Tax 17,716$                          16,076$                (1,640)$                   17,911$                (1,835)$                   
Net earnings 11,283$                          10,217$                (1,066)$                   11,389$                (1,172)$                   
EPS 0.60$                               0.54$                     (0.06)$                      0.60$                    (0.06)$                     
2 Sales Returns and Allowance Misstatement
This is the entry that SHOULD have been applied
debit AR allowance 1,030                       
credit Sales returns and allowance 1,030                    
This is the misstated entry that was recorded instead of above
Debit Sales returns and allowance 1,030                       
credit AR allowance 1,030                    
misstatement (2,060)                      effect on net sales
Effect of misstatement on balances/figures This Manip Manipulated Unmanipulated $ chg % chg
Sales, Net understated 122,360                124,420                  (2,060) -1.7%
Accounts receivable, Net understated 28,594                  30,654                    (2,060) -6.7%
AR Net under because AR allowance overstated (3,510)                   (11,772)                   8,262   -70.2%
Other short-term liabilities understated (721)                         7,782                    9,077                       (1,295) -14.3%
Accounts Excluded from their analysis
Total Current Assets understated (TA under too) (2,060)                      59,887                  63,587                    (3,700) -5.8%
Total Current Liabilities understated (TL under too) (721)                         18,896                  20,191                    (1,295) -6.4%
Retained earnings understated (1,339)                      60,312                  62,717                    (2,405) -3.8%
Tax expense understated (721)                         4,781                    6,076                       (1,295) -21.3%
All earnings measures
without manip cumulated manip this manip projected manip v projected
Earnings before Int & Tax 17,716$                          14,016$                (2,060)$                   17,911$                (3,895)$                   
Net earnings 11,283$                          8,878$                   (1,339)$                   11,389$                (2,511)$                   
EPS 0.60$                               0.47$                     (0.07)$                      0.60$                    (0.13)$                     
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Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTED
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual
BALANCE SHEETS
CURRENT ASSETS
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 14,553$      14,900$          -2.3% 21,636       -32.7%
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, NET 28,594        30,100            -5.0% 25,692       11.3%
INVENTORY, NET 16,740        17,500            -4.3% 15,750       6.3%
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 59,887        62,500            -4.2% 63,078       -5.1%
LONG-TERM ASSETS
PROPERTY, PLANT, & EQUIPMENT 41,730        41,100            1.5% 33,652       24.0%
ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION (4,975)         (5,200)             -4.3% (3,702)        34.4%
INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 3,779           4,400              -14.1% 1,866          102.5%
TOTAL LONG-TERM ASSETS 40,534        40,300            0.6% 31,816       27.4%
TOTAL ASSETS 100,421$    102,800$       -2.3% 94,894       5.8%
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 11,114$      10,928$          1.7% 10,530       5.5%
OTHER SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES 7,782           8,195              -5.0% 9,703          -19.8%
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 18,896        19,123            -1.2% 20,233       -6.6%
TOTAL LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2,381           2,022              17.8% 2,512          -5.2%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 21,277        21,145            0.6% 22,745       -6.5%
EQUITY
COMMON STOCK 18,832        18,832            0.0% 18,832       0.0%
RETAINED EARNINGS 60,312        62,823            -4.0% 53,317       13.1%
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY 79,144        81,655            -3.1% 72,149       9.7%
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 100,421$    102,800$       -2.3% 94,894       5.8%
 Q2 - 
ACTUAL 
 Q2 - 
PROJECTED 
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
 Q1 - 
ACTUAL 
 Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual 
SALES, NET 122,360$    124,015$       -1.3% 112,954     8.3%
COST OF SALES 61,059        58,964            3.6% 54,599       11.8%
GROSS MARGIN 61,301        65,051            -5.8% 58,355       5.0%
SELLING, GENERAL, ADMINSTRATIVE AND OTHER 47,285        47,140            0.3% 42,320       11.7%
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES 14,016        17,911            -21.7% 16,035       -12.6%
INTEREST EXPENSE 357              389                  -8.2% 319             11.9%
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES 13,659        17,522            -22.0% 15,716       -13.1%
TAX ON EARNINGS 35% 4,781           6,133              -22.0% 5,501          -13.1%
NET EARNINGS 8,878$        11,389$          -22.0% 10,215       -13.1%
EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) 0.47$           0.60$              -21.7% 0.54            -13.0%
SELLING, GENERAL, AMINISTRATIVE, AND OTHER DETAIL
SELLING 17,628        17,281            2.0% 14,303       23.2%
ADMINISTRATIVE 25,871        25,467            1.6% 23,124       11.9%
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1,920           2,577              -25.5% 1,998          -3.9%
WARRANTY 1,866           1,815              2.8% 2,895          -35.5%
TOTAL S,G,A,&O 47,285        47,140            0.3% 42,320       11.7%
 Q2 - 
ACTUAL 
 Q2 - 
PROJECTED 
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
 Q1 - 
ACTUAL 
Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES 4,985$        5,622$            -11.3% 10,870       -54.1%
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES (8,078)         (7,448)             8.5% (10,873)      -25.7%
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES (3,990)         (4,910)             -18.7% 456             -975.0%
NET CHANGE IN CASH FLOWS (7,083)         (6,736)             5.2% 453             -1663.6%
CASH AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD 21,636        21,636            0.0% 21,183       2.1%
CASH AT END OF PERIOD 14,553$      14,900$          -2.3% 21,636       -32.7%
EARNINGS STATEMENTS
CASH FLOWS STATEMENTS
SOUND SYSTEM CO.
2013 CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
*($ THOUSANDS EXCEPT EPS)
(UNAUDITED AND SUBJECT TO RECLASSIFICATION)
APPENDIX C, continued
CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS
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APPENDIX C, continued
LIQUIDITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
CURRENT RATIO = TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS/TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 3.17          3.27           3.12          
QUICK RATIO = (TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS - INVENTORY)/TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 2.28          2.35           2.34          
ALLOWANCE FOR UNCOLLECTABLE ACCOUNTS AS A PERCENT OF ACCOUNTS 
RECEIVABLE, NET = (AR ALLOWANCE/NET AR) 12.28% 8.39% 8.93%
CASH TO TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES = CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS/TOTAL 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 0.77          0.78           1.07          
ACTIVITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
RECEIVABLES TURNOVER (CREDIT SALES/AVERAGE NET AR) 2.43          2.48           2.68          
INVENTORIES TURNOVER (COS/AVG NET INVENTORY) 3.76          3.55           3.79          
ASSET TURNOVER (NET SALES/NET PP&E) 3.33          3.45           3.77          
PROFITABILITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
SALES RETURNS AND ALLOWANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET SALES 7.6% 6.0% 7.3%
COST OF SALES AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 49.9% 47.5% 48.3%
GROSS MARGIN PERCENT OF NET SALES 50.1% 52.5% 51.7%
SGA&O AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 38.6% 38.0% 37.5%
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 11.5% 14.4% 14.2%
NET EARNINGS AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 7.3% 9.2% 9.0%
RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS (NET EARNINGS/(AVERAGE ASSETS) 9.09% 11.52% 10.76%
RETURN ON AVERAGE EQUITY (NET EARNINGS/(AVERAGE STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY) 13.40% 16.88% 16.28%
COVERAGE
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES TO TOTAL ASSETS 2.37% 1.97% 2.65%
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES TO EQUITY 3.01% 2.48% 3.48%
TIMES INTEREST EARNED (EBIT/INTEREST EXPENSE) 39.26        46.04         50.27        
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATIONS TO LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2.09          2.78           4.33          
INVESTMENT VALUATION RATIOS
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE (EPS) 0.47$        0.60$         0.54$        
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE TO EPS RATIO 53.19        32.08         27.78        
BOOK VALUE PER COMMON SHARE (TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY/COMMON 
STOCK) 4.20$        4.34$         3.83$        
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE PER BOOK VALUE PER COMMON SHARE (STOCK 
PRICE PER SHARE/ BOOK VALUE PER SHARE) 5.95$        4.44$         3.92$        
NOTES TO 2013 FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
PERCENT OF SALES ON CREDIT 54.0% 55.7% 57.5%
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE LAST TRADING DAY OF QUARTER 25.00$     19.25$       15.00$     
DIVIDENDS PER COMMON SHARE 0.10$        0.10$         -$          
SOUND SYSTEM CO.
*Q2 2013 FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS
PREPARED BY MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
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Appendix C, continued: Details and Financial Statements: Earnings-decreasing 
Manipulation 
SOUND SYSTEMS, CO. 
NOTES TO THE Q2 2013 CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
 
1.DESCRIPTION OF BUSINESS 
 Sound Systems, Co. designs, manufactures, markets, and sells home audio products in retail 
outlets in the Southwest U.S. and on the Internet throughout the U.S. Our audio components and 
speakers, sold under our own name provide high-quality sound for home and PC devices. Our 
3D echo control technology immerses the user in sound, which allows them to perceive sounds 
as coming from various points in the room. 
 
2.ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
Accounts receivable are comprised of the following (in thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Accounts receivable, gross $ 39,395 $ 38,774 
Allowance for doubtful accounts  (2,280)   (2,295) 
Allowance for sales returns and 
discounts 
 (7,161)  (8,262) 
Accounts receivable, net $ 29,954 $ 28,217 
Allowances are recorded based on historical trends, market conditions, and quarterly estimates 
by management. 
3.INVENTORIES 
Inventories recorded at the lower of cost or market are comprised of the following (in 
thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Inventories, gross $ 21,486 $ 17,798 
LCM inventory reserve  (1,406)   (2,048) 
Inventories, net $ 20,080 $ 15,750 
In Q2 and Q1, we recorded $.95 million and $1.42 million of charges to cost of sales for 
inventory write-downs for products with reduced market value, respectively. 
  
4.INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
Intangible assets recorded at the present-value of expected future cash flows are comprised of the 
following (in thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Intangible assets, gross $ 1,915 $ 2,033 
Accumulated amortization  (136)   (74) 
Intangible assets, net $ 1,779 $ 1,959 
In Q2 and Q1, we recorded $ 62 thousand and $3 thousand of charges to selling, general, and 
administrative expense for amortization, respectively. 
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Appendix C, continued: Details and Financial Statements: Earnings-decreasing 
Manipulation 
 
5.LONG-TERM DEBT 
Long-term debt recorded at fair market value consists of the following (in thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Installment notes with interest ranging 
from 8.2% to 9.8% 
$ 2,512 $ 2,643 
Less current maturities  (131)   (131) 
Total long-term liabilities $ 2,381 $ 2,512 
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Appendix D: Details and Financial Statements: Earnings-increasing Manipulation 
 
Original Case - Earnings Increasing Manipulations (in thousands)
APPENDIX D
1 Cost of sales and inventory manipulation 
This is the entry that SHOULD have been applied
debit Inventory 1,680                       
COS 3,320                       
credit MOH 5,000                    
This is the misstated entry that was recorded instead of above
Debit COS 1,680                       
Inventory 3,320                       
credit MOH 5,000                    
misstatement (1,640)                      effect on cost of sales
Effect of misstatement on balances/figures Manipulated Unmanipulated $ chg % chg
COS understated 57,779                  59,419                    (1,640) -2.8%
Inventory overstated 20,020                  18,380                    1,640   8.9%
Other short-term liabilities overstated 9,651                    9,077                       574       6.3%
Accounts Excluded from their analysis
Total Current Assets overstated (TA over too) 65,227                  63,587                    1,640   2.6%
Total Current Liabilities overstated (TL over too) 20,765                  20,191                    574       2.8%
Retained earnings overstated 63,783                  62,717                    1,066   1.7%
Tax expense overstated 6,650                    6,076                       574       9.4%
All earnings measures overstated
unmanipulated manipulated this manip projected manip v projected
Earnings before Int & Tax 17,716$                          19,356$                1,640$                     17,911$                1,445$                    
Net earnings 11,283$                          12,349$                1,066$                     11,389$                960$                        
EPS 0.60$                               0.66$                     0.06$                       0.60$                    0.06$                       
2 Sales Returns and Allowance Misstatement
This is the entry that SHOULD have been applied
debit AR allowance 1,030                       
credit Sales returns and allowance 1,030                    
This is the misstated entry that was recorded instead of above
Debit Sales returns and allowance 1,030                       
credit AR allowance 1,030                    
misstatement 2,060                       effect on net sales
Effect of misstatement on balances/figures This Manip Manipulated Unmanipulated $ chg % chg
Sales, Net overstated 126,480                124,420                  2,060   1.7%
Accounts receivable, Net overstated 32,714                  30,654                    2,060   6.7%
AR Net over because AR allowance understated (1,450)                   (9,712)                     8,262   -85.1%
Other short-term liabilities understated 721                           10,372                  9,077                       1,295   14.3%
Accounts Excluded from their analysis
Total Current Assets overstated (TA over too) 2,060                       67,287                  63,587                    3,700   5.8%
Total Current Liabilities overstated (TL over too) 721                           21,486                  20,191                    1,295   6.4%
Retained earnings overstated 1,339                       65,122                  62,717                    2,405   3.8%
Tax expense overstated 721                           7,371                    6,076                       1,295   21.3%
All earnings measures
without manip cumulated manip this manip projected manip v projected
Earnings before Int & Tax 17,716$                          21,416$                2,060$                     17,911$                3,505$                    
Net earnings 11,283$                          13,688$                1,339$                     11,389$                2,299$                    
EPS 0.60$                               0.73$                     0.07$                       0.60$                    0.13$                       
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Appendix D, continued: Details and Financial Statements: Earnings-increasing 
Manipulation 
 
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTED
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual
BALANCE SHEETS
CURRENT ASSETS
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 14,553$      14,900$          -2.3% 21,636       -32.7%
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, NET 32,714        30,100            8.7% 25,692       27.3%
INVENTORY, NET 20,020        17,500            14.4% 15,750       27.1%
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 67,287        62,500            7.7% 63,078       6.7%
LONG-TERM ASSETS
PROPERTY, PLANT, & EQUIPMENT 41,730        41,100            1.5% 33,652       24.0%
ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION (4,975)         (5,200)             -4.3% (3,702)        34.4%
INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 3,779           4,400              -14.1% 1,866          102.5%
TOTAL LONG-TERM ASSETS 40,534        40,300            0.6% 31,816       27.4%
TOTAL ASSETS 107,821$    102,800$       4.9% 94,894       13.6%
LIABILITIES
CURRENT LIABILITIES
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 11,114$      10,928$          1.7% 10,530       5.5%
OTHER SHORT-TERM LIABILITIES 10,372        8,195              26.6% 9,703          6.9%
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 21,486        19,123            12.4% 20,233       6.2%
TOTAL LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2,381           2,022              17.8% 2,512          -5.2%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 23,867        21,145            12.9% 22,745       4.9%
EQUITY
COMMON STOCK 18,832        18,832            0.0% 18,832       0.0%
RETAINED EARNINGS 65,122        62,823            3.7% 53,317       22.1%
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY 83,954        81,655            2.8% 72,149       16.4%
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 107,821$    102,800$       4.9% 94,894       13.6%
 Q2 - 
ACTUAL 
 Q2 - 
PROJECTED 
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
 Q1 - 
ACTUAL 
 Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual 
SALES, NET 126,480$    124,015$       2.0% 112,954     12.0%
COST OF SALES 57,779        58,964            -2.0% 54,599       5.8%
GROSS MARGIN 68,701        65,051            5.6% 58,355       17.7%
SELLING, GENERAL, ADMINSTRATIVE AND OTHER 47,285        47,140            0.3% 42,320       11.7%
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES 21,416        17,911            19.6% 16,035       33.6%
INTEREST EXPENSE 357              389                  -8.2% 319             11.9%
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES 21,059        17,522            20.2% 15,716       34.0%
TAX ON EARNINGS 35% 7,371           6,133              20.2% 5,501          34.0%
NET EARNINGS 13,688$      11,389$          20.2% 10,215       34.0%
EARNINGS PER SHARE (EPS) 0.73$           0.60$              21.7% 0.54            35.2%
SELLING, GENERAL, AMINISTRATIVE, AND OTHER DETAIL
SELLING 17,628        17,281            2.0% 14,303       23.2%
ADMINISTRATIVE 25,871        25,467            1.6% 23,124       11.9%
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 1,920           2,577              -25.5% 1,998          -3.9%
WARRANTY 1,866           1,815              2.8% 2,895          -35.5%
TOTAL S,G,A,&O 47,285        47,140            0.3% 42,320       11.7%
 Q2 - 
ACTUAL 
 Q2 - 
PROJECTED 
Difference 
Actual v. 
Projected
 Q1 - 
ACTUAL 
Difference 
Q2 Actual v. 
Q1 Actual
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES 4,985$        5,622$            -11.3% 10,870       -54.1%
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES (8,078)         (7,448)             8.5% (10,873)      -25.7%
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES (3,990)         (4,910)             -18.7% 456             -975.0%
NET CHANGE IN CASH FLOWS (7,083)         (6,736)             5.2% 453             -1663.6%
CASH AT BEGINNING OF PERIOD 21,636        21,636            0.0% 21,183       2.1%
CASH AT END OF PERIOD 14,553$      14,900$          -2.3% 21,636       -32.7%
EARNINGS STATEMENTS
CASH FLOWS STATEMENTS
SOUND SYSTEM CO.
2013 CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
**($ THOUSANDS EXCEPT EPS)
(UNAUDITED AND SUBJECT TO RECLASSIFICATION)
APPENDIX D, continued
CONDENSED BALANCE SHEETS
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Manipulation 
 
APPENDIX D, continued
LIQUIDITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
CURRENT RATIO = TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS/TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 3.13          3.27           3.12          
QUICK RATIO = (TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS - INVENTORY)/TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 2.20          2.35           2.34          
ALLOWANCE FOR UNCOLLECTABLE ACCOUNTS AS A PERCENT OF ACCOUNTS 
RECEIVABLE, NET = (AR ALLOWANCE/NET AR) 4.43% 8.39% 8.93%
CASH TO TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES = CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS/TOTAL 
CURRENT LIABILITIES 0.68          0.78           1.07          
ACTIVITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
RECEIVABLES TURNOVER (CREDIT SALES/AVERAGE NET AR) 2.34          2.48           2.68          
INVENTORIES TURNOVER (COS/AVG NET INVENTORY) 3.23          3.55           3.79          
ASSET TURNOVER (NET SALES/NET PP&E) 3.44          3.45           3.77          
PROFITABILITY
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
SALES RETURNS AND ALLOWANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF NET SALES 5.7% 6.0% 7.3%
COST OF SALES AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 45.7% 47.5% 48.3%
GROSS MARGIN PERCENT OF NET SALES 54.3% 52.5% 51.7%
SGA&O AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 37.4% 38.0% 37.5%
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 16.9% 14.4% 14.2%
NET EARNINGS AS A PERCENT OF NET SALES 10.8% 9.2% 9.0%
RETURN ON AVERAGE ASSETS (NET EARNINGS/(AVERAGE ASSETS) 13.50% 11.52% 10.76%
RETURN ON AVERAGE EQUITY (NET EARNINGS/(AVERAGE STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY) 19.94% 16.88% 16.28%
COVERAGE
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES TO TOTAL ASSETS 2.21% 1.97% 2.65%
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES TO EQUITY 2.84% 2.48% 3.48%
TIMES INTEREST EARNED (EBIT/INTEREST EXPENSE) 59.99        46.04         50.27        
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATIONS TO LONG-TERM LIABILITIES 2.09          2.78           4.33          
INVESTMENT VALUATION RATIOS
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
EARNINGS PER COMMON SHARE (EPS) 0.73$        0.60$         0.54$        
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE TO EPS RATIO 34.25        32.08         27.78        
BOOK VALUE PER COMMON SHARE (TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY/COMMON 
STOCK) 4.46$        4.34$         3.83$        
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE PER BOOK VALUE PER COMMON SHARE (STOCK 
PRICE PER SHARE/ BOOK VALUE PER SHARE) 5.61$        4.44$         3.92$        
NOTES TO 2013 FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS
Q2 - 
ACTUAL
Q2 - 
PROJECTE
Q1 - 
ACTUAL
PERCENT OF SALES ON CREDIT 54.0% 55.7% 57.5%
STOCK PRICE PER COMMON SHARE LAST TRADING DAY OF QUARTER 25.00$     19.25$       15.00$     
DIVIDENDS PER COMMON SHARE 0.10$        0.10$         -$          
SOUND SYSTEM CO.
**Q2 2013 FINANCIAL RATIO ANALYSIS
PREPARED BY MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
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Appendix D, continued: Details and Financial Statements: Earnings-increasing 
Manipulation 
SOUND SYSTEMS, CO. 
NOTES TO THE Q2 2013 CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
 
1.DESCRIPTION OF BUSINESS 
 Sound Systems, Co. designs, manufactures, markets, and sells home audio products in retail 
outlets in the Southwest U.S. and on the Internet throughout the U.S. Our audio components and 
speakers, sold under our own name provide high-quality sound for home and PC devices. Our 
3D echo control technology immerses the user in sound, which allows them to perceive sounds 
as coming from various points in the room. 
 
2.ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 
Accounts receivable are comprised of the following (in thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Accounts receivable, gross $ 38,395 $ 38,774 
Allowance for doubtful accounts  (2,480)   (2,295) 
Allowance for sales returns and 
discounts 
 (8,461)  (8,262) 
Accounts receivable, net $ 32,714 $ 25,692 
Allowances are recorded based on historical trends, market conditions, and quarterly estimates 
by management. 
3.INVENTORIES 
Inventories recorded at the lower of cost or market are comprised of the following (in 
thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Inventories, gross $ 21,486 $ 17,798 
LCM inventory reserve  (1,406)   (2,048) 
Inventories, net $ 20,080 $ 15,750 
In Q2 and Q1, we recorded $.95 million and $1.42 million of charges to cost of sales for 
inventory write-downs for products with reduced market value, respectively. 
  
4.INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
Intangible assets recorded at the present-value of expected future cash flows are comprised of the 
following (in thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Intangible assets, gross $ 1,915 $ 2,033 
Accumulated amortization  (136)   (74) 
Intangible assets, net $ 1,779 $ 1,959 
In Q2 and Q1, we recorded $ 62 thousand and $3 thousand of charges to selling, general, and 
administrative expense for amortization, respectively. 
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Appendix D, continued: Details and Financial Statements: Earnings-increasing 
Manipulation 
5.LONG-TERM DEBT 
Long-term debt recorded at fair market value consists of the following (in thousands): 
 Q2 2013 Q1 2013 
Installment notes with interest ranging 
from 8.2% to 9.8% 
$ 2,512 $ 2,643 
Less current maturities  (131)   (131) 
Total long-term liabilities $ 2,381 $ 2,512 
 
  
84 
 
Appendix E: Survey Information 
  Principal Investigator: Stanley Biggs, Ph.D. 
Student: Paul Goodchild, Doctoral Candidate 
Title of Study: The Effect of Video Financial Reporting, Disclosure Tone, and Earnings 
condition on Financial analysis decision-making Quality 
You are invited to participate in a survey designed to improve our understanding of the 
effect of reporting of accounting information. I am a doctoral candidate at the University of 
Connecticut and I am conducting this survey as part of the requirements to complete my 
dissertation in accounting. I am investigating the use of reported accounting information. Your 
participation in this survey is voluntary and you may stop any time for any reason. You can skip 
any question that you do not want to answer for any reason.  
Your participation is anonymous and you will not be contacted regarding this survey. In 
order to complete the survey, you are being asked to analyze financial reports provided, complete 
a case survey, and answer a few questions about yourself. This should take approximately 30 - 
60 minutes of your time. This survey involves limited risk to you; however, the benefits of your 
participation may improve our knowledge of reporting of accounting information. Your 
participation is voluntary and may be discontinued at any time. 
You will not be paid for your participation in this survey, but you will have the option to 
enter into a random drawing for a $25 Amazon.com gift card. After completing the survey, you 
may enter into the voluntary drawing at the link provided. Two (2) gift certificates will be 
randomly awarded on or about June 1, 2014. Each participant can only win one (1) gift 
certificate.  
If you have further questions about this survey or a research-related problem, we will be 
happy to address your concerns. Please contact me, or my advisor, Stanley Biggs, KPMG & 
Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Accounting at (860) 486-2374. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of 
Connecticut Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (860) 486-8802. The IRB reviews research 
studies to protect the rights and welfare of research participants. 
 Please complete the survey at the link below by DATE or click here to opt out.  
Thank you, 
Paul Goodchild, CPA (MA, CT) 
Doctoral Candidate 
School of Business 
University of Connecticut 
2100 Hillside Road, Unit 1041 
Storrs, CT 06269-1041 
paul.goodchild@business.uconn.edu 
office: (860) 486.5987 
cell: (413) 537.3525 
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Appendix F: Survey Disclosure Document 
 
PLEASE CAREFULLY READ ALL INFORMATION 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you may discontinue or withdraw participation at 
any time during the experiment. You may skip questions you would prefer not to answer. 
All responses including your demographic information will be confidentially maintained to the 
degree permitted by the technology used. This information will not be reported or used in any 
manner that would reveal personally identifying information or be released to any outside (third) 
parties unless legally required. However, it should be noted that when required by law, this 
information, along with other information that might be available, may enable the identification 
of an individual involved. No guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via 
the Internet by any third parties. The feedback and information you provide will be used in 
academic research and only reported in aggregate.  
If you have any questions about your participation in this research survey, please contact Paul 
Goodchild (Doctoral Candidate), or my advisor Stanley Biggs, KPMG & Board of Trustees 
Distinguished Professor of Accounting at (860) 486-2374. If you have questions about your 
rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of Connecticut Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) at The Whetten Graduate Center, Room 214, University of Connecticut, 
438 Whitney Road Extension, Unit-1246, Storrs, CT 06269-1246, by phone at (860) 486-8802, 
or UConn’s website at http://www.irb.uconn.edu/. The IRB is responsible for protecting the 
rights and welfare of research participants. 
 
Please review the instructions on each screen carefully.  
If you encounter any difficulties or have any questions about this survey, please contact:  
Paul Goodchild (Doctoral Candidate) 
School of Business 
University of Connecticut 
2100 Hillside Rd, Unit 1041 
Storrs, CT 06269 
email: paul.goodchild@business.uconn.edu  
office: (860) 486.5987 
cell: (413) 537.3525 
 
Click here to begin this survey    Click here to opt out of this survey 
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Appendix G: Background 
You are the Senior Investment Analyst for ECT Electronics Inc., a retailer of home audio 
electronics and entertainment software. ECT Electronics has successfully grown throughout the 
northeast by offering quality products and service at a competitive price. The Board of Directors 
asked management to expand the business nationally through acquisitions. At a mergers and 
acquisitions conference in Boston, ECT Electronics’ CEO Stan Sinclair and CFO Andy James 
identified Sound Systems Co., a family controlled public company as a potential target. Sound 
Systems manufactures and sells home audio products through its own retail locations in 
California, Nevada, and Arizona.  
The family controlling Sound Systems Co. would like to capitalize on strong recent 
growth and are aggressively seeking buyers. Sound Systems’ CEO, Dave “Pappy” Mason has 
been marketing Sound Systems’ quality manufacturing process, cost effective distribution 
network, innovative products, and well positioned retail chain. Stan and Andy were intrigued by 
the prospects of Sound Systems and the synergies that such an acquisition might create. They 
believe the acquisition would allow ECT Electronics to quickly capture southwest market share 
and create a highly profitable “ECT Electronics” line of home audio products. Andy and Stan 
met with Dave and scheduled the Acquisitions team to perform due diligence on Sound Systems 
Co. after the 2012 Q1 results were reported.  
Paul Graham, the Manager of Acquisitions and his team visited Sound Systems Co. in 
May 2012. The team examined accounting records from 2010 through 2012, observed 
operations, and met with executive management. In June, Paul met with Stan and Andy to 
discuss the financial and nonfinancial information obtained during the visit. Paul reported that 
Sound Systems has a solid reputation for quality manufacturing and innovation in its industry, 
but the leading consumer guide reported a decreasing customer satisfaction trend over the past 
three years. Paul asked Dave about the trend and Dave said the ratings reflect, “growing pains 
that all fast growing companies face,” and, “the improvements being implemented in 
manufacturing and quality control systems will address these concerns.” He expects consumer 
satisfaction to return to pre-growth levels and investors to benefit from increased efficiency and 
reduced costs of poor quality. 
Sound Systems Co. experienced two years of sales and earnings growth and Dave 
projected a similar growth pattern through 2015 due to their commitment retail store expansion. 
Sound Systems’ common stock was selling for $15.00 per share at the close of Q1, which is 25 
times reported Q1 EPS of $.59 per common share. Paul said, Sound Systems’ projected a 
quarterly increase of $.10 - $.14 per share for each quarter through 2012. Paul projected Q2 EPS 
of $.62, when Paul asked Dave about Sound Systems’ projection Dave said, “We expect 
continued savings in COGS, because of our manufacturing improvements and we have initiated a 
number of cost saving initiatives in SG&A.” Paul also reported that executives and directors 
receive cash and common stock bonuses based on the achievement of sales, expense, and EPS 
targets, which are paid in current and deferred compensation. The report includes Paul’s 
projected financial statements for Q2 2012, which Stan and Andy have decided need to be 
compared to actual results before they seek approval to finalize the acquisition from ECT 
Electronics’ Board of Directors.  
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Appendix H: CFO Letter with Instructions 
To: Financial Planning Department 
From: Andy James, CFO 
July 30, 2013 
RE: Analysis of Sound Systems Co. Financial Reports 
 We announced the acquisition of Sound Systems Co. on July 3rd and this acquisition is a 
great opportunity to establish ECT Electronics in the southwest, but presents substantial risk if 
we are unable to accurately forecast Sound Systems’ future performance. The Acquisitions Team 
visited in May and performed due diligence. They prepared a package that includes; Q2 2013 
Condensed Financial Statements and Financial Ratios (actual and projected) and Q1 2013 
(actual), and the Q2 2013 earnings release. The projection for Q2 2013 was developed by the 
Acquisitions Department during their May visit. The Q2 2013 projections were prepared 
internally and have been thoroughly vetted and crosschecked. 
 I would like Financial Planning to analyze the Q2 2013 actual financial reports versus 
projected and identify any misstatements before we finalize the acquisition. Focus on Sound 
Systems’ Actual Q2 2013 condensed financial statements as the source of potential 
misstatements. Sound Systems has reported a trend of earnings growth and used substantial cash 
investing in upgrading their manufacturing operations and retail outlets.  
I am concerned they may not be able to continue such earnings growth. Please review and 
analyze the documents, and answer the questions attached. It is important to determine whether 
the account balances, figures, and cash flows are properly stated. Specifically, I would like you 
to identify all account balances, figures, and cash flows you feel are definitely or almost 
definitely misstated or probably misstated and estimate the percentage of misstatement. It is 
critical that I account for any misstatements you identify in determining Sound Systems’ ability 
to continue growing quality earnings.  
Your feedback will be included in my presentation to Stan and our Board. They will 
carefully review our reports before they finalize this investment. 
 
Thank you,  
Andy 
 
 
 
Proceed to the financial information or you may opt out now. 
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Appendix I: Conservative Earnings-release Script (Text) 
July 26, 2013  
Phoenix, AZ, Sound Systems Co. reports second quarter EPS of $.60, revises the lower end of 
annual EPS down, and now expects 2013 annual EPS of $2.69 To $2.81. 
Sales for the quarter reflected a challenging economy, yet we were able to make stable progress 
towards our projected earnings goals through our manufacturing improvements and service 
business. Cost savings were reflected in our consistent gross margin. Selling, general, 
administrative, and other cost changes were primarily driven by sales commissions, 
administrative costs related to our acquisition, offset by warranty expense. 
 
Sound Systems’ CEO Dave “Pappy” Mason, said, “On July 3rd, 2013, we announced the 
acquisition of our outstanding common shares by ECT Technologies, Inc. and we are in the 
process of finalizing that agreement, which is expected to close in the third quarter. We believe: 
our history of steady earnings performance; our manufacturing improvements; and, business 
synergies represent value for ECT Technologies’ shareholders. We anticipate continuing 
operations under the Sound Systems’ name through 2014; when our quality products and service 
will begin operating under the ECT Technologies name.”  
 
“As for our Q3 results, our same store sales were flat, bolstered by the partial completion of 
some anticipated improvements to our retail locations. Our improvements enabled us to maintain 
same store sales levels, in a challenging market. We expect this trend in our markets to continue 
during the latter half of the year. We face intense competition and end-of-year volume discounts 
during our traditionally busy holiday season. This causes our need to decrease the lower end of 
our EPS range for the full year. We now expect 2013 earnings per share of $2.65 to $2.81, which 
represents stable growth versus prior year,” said Pappy. 
 
Cash flows from operations remain within our planned range for 2013. We anticipate cash flows 
from operations to be approximately 30% of earnings before earnings taxes through 2013.Cash 
outflows from financing activities were primarily driven by payments on leased retail outlets. We 
expect similar outflows for the next two quarters, before we begin to shift our retail outlets from 
malls to free standing destination locations. 
 
We continued the strategic implementation of our $50 million, five-year investment plan 
announced in 2010. Cash outflow for investment activities was within our ability to generate 
cash through operations, as we are putting our cash to use in financing our investment plan. 
Approximately 40 percent of that cash investment was put into service as new assets: in our 
manufacturing plant, service, and retail locations. We anticipate cash outflows from investing 
activity will approximate 75 percent of net earnings through the end of the year. 
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Appendix I, continued: Conservative Earnings-release Script (Text) 
 
“I am here to reaffirm our commitment to our customers and ECT Technologies shareholders. 
We will continue to offer customers reliable products and service as we look forward to Q3 
2013,” said Pappy. 
 
This news release contains forward-looking statements that reflect management’s current views 
and estimates regarding company performance and financial results. We are not obligated to 
update or revise any forward-looking statements after the date of this release. For additional 
information, see our reports on Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filed with the SEC from time to time. 
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Appendix I, continued: Conservative Earnings-release Script (Video) 
 
July 26, 2013 
 
Narrator voice only, prior to CEO appearing on video 
 
Phoenix, AZ, Sound Systems Co. reports second quarter EPS of $.60, revises the lower end of 
annual EPS down, and now expects 2013 annual EPS of $2.69 To $2.81 over prior year. 
 
Spoken by CEO 
 
Sales for the quarter reflected a challenging economy, yet we were able to make stable progress 
towards our projected earnings goals through our manufacturing improvements and service 
business. Cost savings were reflected in our consistent gross margin. Selling, general, 
administrative, and other cost changes were primarily driven by sales commissions, 
administrative costs related to our acquisition, offset by warranty expense. 
 
 “On July 3rd, 2013, we announced the acquisition of our outstanding common shares by ECT 
Technologies, Inc. and we are in the process of finalizing that agreement, which is expected to 
close in the third quarter. We believe: our history of steady earnings performance; our 
manufacturing improvements; and, business synergies represent value for ECT Technologies’ 
shareholders. We anticipate continuing operations under the Sound Systems’ name through 
2014; when our quality products and service will begin operating under the ECT Technologies 
name.”  
 
“As for our Q3 results, our same store sales were flat, bolstered by the partial completion of 
some anticipated improvements to our retail locations. Our improvements enabled us to maintain 
same store sales levels, in a challenging market. We expect this trend in our markets to continue 
during the latter half of the year. We face intense competition and end-of-year volume discounts 
during our traditionally busy holiday season. This causes our need to decrease the lower end of 
our EPS range for the full year. We now expect 2013 earnings per share of $2.65 to $2.81, which 
represents stable growth versus prior year.” 
 
Cash flows from operations remain within our planned range for 2013. We anticipate cash flows 
from operations to be approximately 30% of earnings before earnings taxes through 2013.Cash 
outflows from financing activities were primarily driven by payments on leased retail outlets. We 
expect similar outflows for the next two quarters, before we begin to shift our retail outlets from 
malls to free standing destination locations. 
 
We continued the strategic implementation of our $50 million, five-year investment plan 
announced in 2010. Cash outflow for investment activities was within our ability to generate 
cash through operations, as we are putting our cash to use in financing our investment plan. 
Approximately 40 percent of that cash investment was put into service as new assets: in our 
manufacturing plant, service, and retail locations. We anticipate cash outflows from investing 
activity will approximate 75 percent of net earnings through the end of the year. 
 
91 
 
Appendix I, continued: Conservative Video Earnings-release Text 
 
“I am here to reaffirm our commitment to our customers and ECT Technologies shareholders. 
We will continue to offer customers reliable products and service as we look forward to Q3 
2013.” 
 
Narrator voice only, after CEO appears on video 
 
This news release contains forward-looking statements that reflect management’s current views 
and estimates regarding company performance and financial results. We are not obligated to 
update or revise any forward-looking statements after the date of this release. For additional 
information, see our reports on Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filed with the SEC from time to time. 
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Appendix J: Aggressive Earnings-release Script (Text) 
 
July 26, 2013 
 
Phoenix, AZ, Sound Systems Co. reports second quarter EPS of $.60, revises lower end of 
annual EPS up, and now expects 2013 annual EPS of $2.69 To $2.81. 
 
Sales for the quarter reflected an improving economy and we were able to make solid progress 
towards our projected earnings goals through our manufacturing improvements and service 
business. Cost savings were reflected in our strong gross margin. Selling, general, administrative 
costs, and other cost changes were primarily driven by sales commissions, administrative costs 
related to our acquisition, offset by warranty expense. 
 
Sound Systems’ CEO Dave “Pappy” Mason, said, “On July 3rd, 2013, we announced the 
acquisition of our outstanding common shares by ECT Technologies, Inc. and we are in the 
process of finalizing that agreement, which is expected to close in the third quarter. We believe 
our: history of strong earnings performance; our manufacturing improvements; and, business 
synergies represent great value for ECT Technologies’ shareholders. We anticipate continued 
operations under the Sound Systems’ name through 2014; when our high quality products and 
service will begin operating under the ECT Technologies name.”  
 
“As for our Q3 results, our same store sales were up, bolstered by the partial completion of some 
highly anticipated improvements to our retail locations. Our improvements enabled us to 
improve same store sales levels in the rebounding market. We expect this trend in our markets to 
continue during the latter half of the year. We face stable competition and end-of-year volume 
sales during our traditionally busy holiday season. This causes our need to increase the lower end 
of our EPS range for the full year. We now expect 2013 earnings per share of $2.65 to $2.81, 
which represents strong growth versus prior year,” said Pappy. 
 
Cash flows from operations remain within the upper end of our planned range for 2013. We 
anticipate cash flows from operations to be approximately 30% of earnings before earnings taxes 
through 2013.Cash outflows from financing activities were primarily driven by payments on 
leased retail outlets. We expect similar outflows for the next two quarters, before we begin the 
plan to shift our retail outlets from malls to free standing destination locations. 
 
We continued the successful implementation of our $50 million, five-year investment plan 
announced in 2010. Cash outflows for investment activities was well within our ability to 
generate cash through operations, as we are putting our cash to good use in financing our 
investment plan. Approximately 80 percent of that cash investment was put into service as new 
assets; improving our manufacturing plant, service, and retail locations. We anticipate cash 
outflows from investing activity will approximate 75 percent of net earnings through the end of 
the year. 
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Appendix J, continued: Aggressive Earnings-release Script (Text) 
 
“I am here to reaffirm our commitment to our customers and ECT Technologies shareholders. 
We will continue to offer customers high quality products and service and we look forward to a 
strong Q3 2013,” said Pappy. 
 
This news release contains forward-looking statements that reflect management’s current views 
and estimates regarding company performance and financial results. We are not obligated to 
update or revise any forward-looking statements after the date of this release. For additional 
information, see our reports on Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filed with the SEC from time to time. 
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Appendix J, continued: Aggressive Video Earnings-release Script (Video) 
 
July 26, 2013 
 
Narrator voice only, prior to CEO appearing on video 
 
Phoenix, AZ, Sound Systems Co. reports second quarter EPS of $.60, revises the lower end of 
annual EPS up, and now expects 2013 annual EPS of $2.69 To $2.81 over prior year. 
 
Spoken by CEO 
 
Sales for the quarter reflected an improving economy and we were able to make solid progress 
towards our projected earnings goals through our manufacturing improvements and service 
business. Cost savings were reflected in our strong gross margin. Selling, general, administrative 
costs, and other cost changes were primarily driven by sales commissions, administrative costs 
related to our acquisition, offset by warranty expense. 
 
“On July 3rd, 2013, we announced the acquisition of our outstanding common shares by ECT 
Technologies, Inc. and we are in the process of finalizing that agreement, which is expected to 
close in the third quarter. We believe our: history of strong earnings performance; our 
manufacturing improvements; and, business synergies represent great value for ECT 
Technologies’ shareholders. We anticipate continued operations under the Sound Systems’ name 
through 2014; when our high quality products and service will begin operating under the ECT 
Technologies name.”  
 
“As for our Q3 results, our same store sales were up, bolstered by the partial completion of some 
highly anticipated improvements to our retail locations. Our improvements enabled us to 
improve same store sales levels in the rebounding market. We expect this trend in our markets to 
continue during the latter half of the year. We face stable competition and end-of-year volume 
sales during our traditionally busy holiday season. This causes our need to increase the lower end 
of our EPS range for the full year. We now expect 2013 earnings per share of $2.65 to $2.81, 
which represents strong growth versus prior year.” 
 
Cash flows from operations remain within the upper end of our planned range for 2013. We 
anticipate cash flows from operations to be approximately 30% of earnings before earnings taxes 
through 2013.Cash outflows from financing activities were primarily driven by payments on 
leased retail outlets. We expect similar outflows for the next two quarters, before we begin the 
plan to shift our retail outlets from malls to free standing destination locations. 
 
We continued the successful implementation of our $50 million, five-year investment plan 
announced in 2010. Cash outflows for investment activities was well within our ability to 
generate cash through operations, as we are putting our cash to good use in financing our 
investment plan. Approximately 80 percent of that cash investment was put into service as new 
assets; improving our manufacturing plant, service, and retail locations. We anticipate cash 
outflows from investing activity will approximate 75 percent of net earnings through the end of 
the year. 
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Appendix J, continued: Aggressive Video Earnings-release Script (Video) 
 
“I am here to reaffirm our commitment to our customers and ECT Technologies shareholders. 
We will continue to offer customers high quality products and service and we look forward to a 
strong Q3 2013.” 
 
Narrator voice only, after CEO appears on video 
This news release contains forward-looking statements that reflect management’s current views 
and estimates regarding company performance and financial results. We are not obligated to 
update or revise any forward-looking statements after the date of this release. For additional 
information, see our reports on Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K filed with the SEC from time to time. 
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Appendix K: Primary Research Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for reviewing and analyzing Sound Systems Company’s financial reports. 
Please review the questions on each screen and answer carefully.  
 
If you encounter any difficulties or have any questions about this survey, please contact:  
Paul Goodchild (Doctoral Candidate) 
School of Business 
University of Connecticut 
2100 Hillside Rd, Unit 1041 
Storrs, CT 06269 
email: paul.goodchild@business.uconn.edu  
office: (860) 486-5987 
 
 
Click here to continue this survey    Click here to opt out of this survey 
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Appendix K, continued: Primary Research Questionnaire 
A. Provide the information in the table below:  
 
1. From the list of accounts, figures, and cash flows reported in the Sound Systems Co. 
Q2 2013 actual financial statements indicate whether it is misstated (yes or no).  
2. Check the box that indicates whether the account, figure, or cash flow is probably 
misstated or almost definitely misstated. 
3. Provide your level of confidence on the seven-point scale. 
 
 
Account 
Misstated 
Yes or 
No 
Definitely 
Misstated 
Almost 
Definitely 
Misstated 
Probably 
Misstated 
Possibly 
Misstated 
Probably 
Not 
Misstated 
Almost 
Definitely 
Not 
Misstated 
Definitely 
Not 
Misstated 
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Appendix K, continued: Primary Research Questionnaire 
B. For the accounts, figures, and cash flows reported in the Sound Systems Co. Q2 2013 actual 
financial statements that you identified as misstated indicate whether the account/figure is 
over or understated. 
C. Provide the amount as a percentage of the account or figure you believe are under or 
overstated. For example if an account had a $7,500 figure, but you feel it should be $10,000 
then it would be 25% understated [(10,000-7,500)/10,000]. 
 
 
Account Overstated Understated 
Percentage 
Misstatement 
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Appendix K, continued: Primary Research Questionnaire 
D. Provide an assessment of the quality of Sound Systems Co.’s Q2 2013 Actual key reported 
figures. 
 
Key Reported Balances/Figures Very 
Good 
Good Fair Poor Very 
Poor 
Total Current Assets      
Total Current Liabilities      
Total Long-Term Assets      
Total Long-Term Liabilities      
Net Income Before Taxes      
Cash Flows from Operating Activities      
      
 
 
E. On a 7-point scale, provide your assessment of the overall quality of Sound Systems Co.’s 
Q2 2013 Actual condensed financial statements. 
 
Statement Very 
Good 
Good Fair Poor Very 
Poor 
Condensed Balance Sheets      
Condensed Statements of Earnings      
Condensed Statements of Cash Flows      
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Appendix K, continued: Primary Research Questionnaire 
Alternative Potential Explanations Questions 
F. Indicate your level of agreement with the statement, “I believe that Dave “Pappy” Mason is 
trustworthy. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
       
 
G. Indicate your level of agreement with the statement, “I believe that Dave “Pappy” Mason is 
likeable. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
       
 
H. Indicate your level of agreement with the statement, “I believe that Dave “Pappy” Mason is 
trustworthy. 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
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Appendix K, continued: Primary Research Questionnaire 
Manipulation Check Questions 
I. Identify the format of Dave “Poppy” Mason’s presentation of the earnings release via: 
 
1. a video press release 
2.  a text press release 
 
J. Indicate your assessment of the tone of the Q2 earnings release. 
 
Strongly 
optimistic 
Somewhat 
optimistic 
Neither 
optimistic 
or 
pessimistic 
Somewhat 
pessimistic 
Strongly 
pessimistic 
     
 
K. Relative to the Q2 projected net earnings prepared by Acquisitions, were the Q2 actual 
earnings? 
 
1. Lower 
2. About the same 
3. Higher 
 
L.  Based on the misstatements you identified, do you believe the Q2 Actual net earnings was? 
 
1. Overstated (misstatement increased earnings) 
2. Properly stated (misstatement had no or offsetting effect on earnings) 
3. Understated (misstatement decreased earnings 
 
M. Indicate your feelings towards the Q2 earnings release. 
 
Strongly 
negative 
Somewhat 
negative 
Neither 
negative or 
positive 
Somewhat 
positive 
Strongly 
positive 
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Appendix L: Demographic Survey 
Thank you for participating in our academic research survey. The feedback and information you 
provide will only be used in academic research and reported in aggregate. All demographic 
information will be confidentially maintained to the degree permitted by the technology used. 
This information will not be reported or used in any manner that would reveal personally 
identifying information or be released to any outside (third) parties unless required by law. 
However, it should be noted that when required by law, this information, along with other 
information that might be available, might enable the identification of an individual involved. No 
guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the Internet by any third 
parties. You may continue or withdraw your participation at any time. 
If you have any questions about your participation in this research survey, please contact Paul 
Goodchild (Doctoral Candidate) (413) 537.3525, or my advisor Stanley Biggs, KPMG & Board 
of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Accounting at (860) 486-2374. If you have questions 
about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the University of Connecticut 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at The Whetten Graduate Center, Room 214, University of 
Connecticut, 438 Whitney Road Extension, Unit-1246, Storrs, CT 06269-1246, by phone at 
(860) 486-8802, or UConn’s website at http://www.irb.uconn.edu/. The IRB is responsible for 
protecting the rights and welfare of research participants. 
 
Click here to begin this survey      Click here to opt out of this 
survey 
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Appendix L, continued: Demographic Survey 
A. What is your age range in years? 
i. 20-25 
ii. 26-30 
iii. 31-35 
iv. 36-40 
v. 41-50 
vi. 50+ 
vii. I prefer not to answer 
 
B.  What is your gender? 
i. Male 
ii. Female 
iii. I prefer not to answer 
 
C. Would you prefer the CEO of a company to be? 
i. Male 
ii. Female 
iii. Does not matter 
iv. I prefer not to answer 
 
D. What is the highest level of education you have completed 
i. Undergraduate college degree 
ii. Master’s Degree 
iii. Doctoral Degree 
iv. Professional Degree 
v. I prefer not to answer 
 
E. What program are you enrolled? 
i. Masters in the Science of Accounting 
ii. Masters of Business Administration 
iii. Undergraduate Accounting 
 
F. How many accounting and finance classes have you completed post high school graduation 
i. 0-2 
ii. 3-4 
iii. 5-6 
iv. 7-8 
v. 9+ 
vi. I prefer not to answer 
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Appendix L, continued: Demographic Survey 
G. How many years of work experience have you completed after undergraduate graduation 
i. Internship 
ii. 1-2 
iii. 3-4 
iv. 5-8 
v. 9+ 
vi. I prefer not to answer 
 
H. Do you have personal or professional investment experience?  
i. yes  
ii. no 
iii. I prefer not to answer 
 
If yes, 
i. Is your investing experience personal or professional 
a. Personal 
b. Professional 
 
ii. How many years of investment experience 
a. 0-2 
b. 3-4 
c. 5-6 
d. 7-8 
e. 9+ 
 
iii. How many trades or investment decisions do you make in an average year 
a. 0-10 
b. 11-30 
c. 31-50 
d. 50+ 
 
iv. Please check the box for all of the following investment types that you are familiar 
with: 
a. IRA,  
b. 401k,  
c. 403b,  
d. personal investment account, or  
e. trading through an investment broker 
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Appendix L, continued: Demographic Survey 
If no, 
Please check the box for all of the following investment types that you are familiar 
with: 
i. IRA,  
ii. 401k,  
iii. 403b,  
iv. personal investment account, or  
v.  trading through an investment broker 
 
I. Have you had any investment training excluding your college education 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
iii. I prefer not to answer 
 
J. How do you rate your personal investment risk profile  
i. High risk – I have or would have 90% to 100% of my portfolio invested in publicly 
trade stocks 
ii. Moderate risk – I have or would have 60% to 89% of my portfolio invested in 
publically traded stocks 
iii. Low risk – I have or would have less than 60% of my portfolio invested in publically 
traded stocks 
iv.  I prefer not to answer 
 
K. How comfortable do you feel using a computer?  
i. Extremely comfortable 
ii. Comfortable 
iii. Somewhat comfortable 
iv. Neither comfortable or uncomfortable 
v. Somewhat uncomfortable 
vi. Uncomfortable 
vii. Extremely uncomfortable 
viii. I prefer not to answer 
 
L. How often do you use the Internet to search for information on a computer or other device? 
i. Never 
ii. Once a month 
iii. Once a week 
iv. Once a day 
v. Multiple times a day 
vi. I prefer not to answer 
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Appendix L, continued: Demographic Survey 
 
M. Please rate your mental effort in completing this task. 
i. Extremely High 
ii. Very High 
iii. High 
iv. Low 
v. Very Low 
vi. Extremely Low 
 
 
N. Please rate your emotional state during this task. 
i. Extremely Happy 
ii. Very Happy 
iii. Happy 
iv. Unhappy 
v. Very Unhappy 
vi. Extremely Unhappy 
 
 
O. Please answer, “I do not agree.” 
vii. Agree 
viii. Neither agree or disagree 
ix. Disagree 
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Appendix L, continued: Demographic Survey 
P. Please review the following statements and answer on a 4-point scale whether you agree or 
do not agree with the statements. 
 
i. I often use mental images or pictures to help me remember things. 
a. I strongly do not agree, 
b. I do not agree,  
c. I agree,  
d. I strongly agree 
e. I prefer not to answer 
 
ii. To understand a process, I imagine the elements of the process. 
a. I strongly do not agree, 
b. I do not agree,  
c. I agree,  
d. I strongly agree 
e. I prefer not to answer 
 
iii. I often use mental pictures to solve problems. 
1. I strongly do not agree, 
2. I do not agree,  
3. I agree,  
4. I strongly agree 
5. I prefer not to answer 
 
iv. I often think in pictures or images. 
1. I strongly do not agree, 
2. I do not agree,  
3. I agree,  
4. I strongly agree 
5. I prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing these questions. Please click here if you would like to opt-in for the 
gift certificate drawing. 
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Appendix L, continued: Demographic Survey 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. If you would like to opt-in to the random 
drawing for one (1) of two (2) $25 Amazon.com gift cards, please click the link below and enter 
your email address. The link will take you to another survey and your email will not be recorded 
with any data you provided on the previous survey. Please make sure you have access to the 
email address provided through June 2014, as the drawing will take place on or about May 20, 
2014, as the gift card will be forwarded directly to you from the Amazon.com website. Once 
created please treat the code as cash. After sending the code, we will not be able to access your 
information. It will be your responsibility as the owner of the email addresses selected to record 
and maintain restricted access to the code until it has been redeemed. Clicking on the link and 
entering your email signifies you agree to these terms and understand that this survey and its 
investigators are not affiliated with Amazon.com in any way. 
 
 
Your email address: _____________________________________________ 
 
Thank you sincerely, 
Paul Goodchild (Doctoral Candidate) 
School of Business 
University of Connecticut 
2100 Hillside Rd, Unit 1041 
Storrs, CT 06269 
email: paul.goodchild@business.uconn.edu  
office: (860) 486-5987 
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Appendix M: Alternative Analyses Control Variables 
a. Professional experience (range in years) 
i. Internship 
ii. 1-2 
iii. 3-4 
iv. 5-8 
v. 9+ 
b. CEO Trust – measurement of CEO trust on a 7-point Likert scale 
c. CEO Likeability – measurement of CEO likability on a 7-point Likert scale. 
d. Visual cognitive style – Adapted by Hoffler, Prechtl, and Nerdel, (2010) it utilizes four items 
designed to assess individual cognitive style for visual material derived from a factor-
analysis of the Individual Differences Questionnaire (Paivio & Harshman, 1983). Responses 
are measured on a 4-point scale (0= I don't agree … 3= I strongly agree): 
i. I often use mental images or pictures to help me remember things. 
ii. To understand a process, I imagine the elements of the process. 
iii. I often use mental pictures to solve problems. 
iv. I often think in pictures or images. 
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Appendix N: Demographic Control Variables 
b. Age range – in years 
i. 18-24 
ii. 25-34 
iii. 35-44 
iv. 45+ 
c. Gender – 1 female, 0 male 
d. Education – highest degree earned 
e. Investment experience – 1 yes, 0 no 
If yes, the following questions: 
i. Investment years – number of years personal or professional investment experience 
ii. Investment type – IRA, 401k, 403b, personal investment account, or through an 
investment broker (1-5) 
iii. Trades – number of trades or investment allocations decisions per year 
f. Investment Training excluding college education – 1 yes, 0 no 
g. Accounting and Finance class range – number of accounting and finance classes completed 
post high school graduation 
i. 0-4 
ii. 5-8 
iii. 9+ 
h. Risk tolerance – personal investment risk profile (1 high, 2 moderate, 3 low) 
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Index of Tables 
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Table 1: Descriptive Data: Participant Observations 
 Panel A: Data    
 Participant observations 131  
 Opted out willingly -19  
 Disqualified due to time (less than 15 or more than 1,500) -30  
 Clicked through the ratings task (less than 5 minutes and 13 or more of the same CI ratings) -15  
 Were assigned to more than one condition -3  
 Participant observations* 64  
    
 Panel B: Participants by condition  
 Video aggressive earnings-increasing 9  
 Video conservative earnings-increasing 5  
 Text conservative earnings-increasing 9  
 Text aggressive earnings-increasing 9  
 Video aggressive earnings-decreasing 7  
 Video conservative earnings-decreasing 10  
 Text conservative earnings-decreasing 10  
 Text aggressive earnings-decreasing 5  
    
    
*tests including additional variables may have fewer observations if the participant data is missing 
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Table 2: Descriptive Data: Participant Responses 
 
Notes:                    
A Mean values and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.     
B P-values are presented for one-tailed tests, ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.   
Panel A: Percent of misstated accounts participants identified as overstated
Video earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 1&2 - mean 5&6)
video aggressive 1 5 video EI video ED diff t p
25% - 18% 7% 0.24 0.41
video conservative 2 6
Text earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 3&4 minus mean 7&8)
text conservative 3 7 text EI text ED diff t p
22% - 28% -5% -0.05 0.48
text aggressive 4 8
Total earnings increasing versus decreasing
diff t p
1% 0.11 0.45
Panel B: Percent of misstated accounts participants identified as understated
Video earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 1&2 - mean 5&6)
video aggressive 1 5 video EI video ED diff t p
16% - 18% -2% -0.93 0.18
video conservative 2 6
Text earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 3&4 minus mean 7&8)
text conservative 3 7 text EI text ED diff t p
21% - 19% 2% -0.23 0.41
text aggressive 4 8
Total earnings increasing versus decreasing
diff t p
0% -0.69 0.25
Earnings 
Increasing
Earnings 
decreasing
25% 13%
8 6
24% 22%
5 9
20% 20%
8 10
24% 35%
9 4
23% 23%
Earnings 
Increasing
Earnings 
decreasing
20% 20%
8 6
12% 16%
5 9
15% 18%
8 10
27% 20%
9 4
18% 18%
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Table 2, continued: Descriptive Data: Participant Responses 
 
Notes:                    
A Mean values and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.     
B P-values are presented for one-tailed tests, ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.                
   
  
Panel C: Percent of all accounts identified as overstated
Video earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 1&2 - mean 5&6)
video aggressive 1 5 video EI video ED diff t p
14% - 16% -2% -1.06 0.15
video conservative 2 6
Text earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 3&4 minus mean 7&8)
text conservative 3 7 text EI text ED diff t p
18% - 21% -3% -0.19 0.43
text aggressive 4 8
Total earnings increasing versus decreasing
diff t p
-3% -0.78 0.22
Panel D: Percent of all accounts identified as understated
video aggressive 1 5 video EI video ED diff t p
14% - 14% 0% -1.05 0.15
video conservative 2 6
text conservative 3 7 text EI text ED difference t p
15% - 20% -5% -0.95 0.17
text aggressive 4 8
difference t p
-2% -1.18 0.12
Earnings 
Increasing
Earnings 
decreasing
18% 14%
8 6
9% 18%
5 9
18% 15%
18% 12%
8 10
17% 27%
9 4
16% 18%
Earnings 
Increasing
Earnings 
decreasing Video earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 1&2 - mean 5&6)
8 6
11% 16%
5 9 Text earnings increasing versus decreasing (mean 3&4 minus mean 7&8)
16% 21%
8 10
14% 18%
9 4 Total earnings increasing versus decreasing
15% 17%
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Table 3: Descriptive Data: Media Format 
 
 
Notes:                    
A Mean values and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.     
B All p-values are presented for one-tailed tests, ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Percent of participants that properly identifed the correct earnings release type
video aggressive 1 5 84% 64 completed participant observations
56 answered the manipulation question
video conservative 2 6 74% 51 participants that correctly answered the manipulation question
91% percentage correct of participants that answered
text conservative 3 7 100% 80% of all completed participant observations
text aggressive 4 8 100%
Panel B: Average time to review financial statements (in seconds)
video diff t p
video aggressive 1 5 645 633.85 245.12 0.92 0.18
video conservative 2 6 623 diff t p
text 291.02 1.03 0.84
text conservative 3 7 424 388.72
diff t p
text aggressive 4 8 354 199.23 0.41 0.66
diff t p
-42.16 -0.17 0.43
Earnings 
Increasing
Earnings 
decreasing
89% 80%
7 4
87% 92%
9 5
60% 89%
5 9
100% 100%
8 9
100% 100%
video conditions versus text conditions
video conservative versus text conservative
8 9
917.76 371.54
8 4 video aggressive versus text aggressive
292.65 953.44
Earnings 
Increasing
Earnings 
decreasing
3 8
329.70 517.93
420.73 286.54
earnings increasing versus earnings decreasing
490 532
7 4
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Table 4: Descriptive Data: Financial Statement Assessment 
 
 
Notes:                    
A Mean values and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.     
B P-values are presented for one-tailed tests, ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
 
 
  
aggressive conservative diff t p
video aggressive 1 5 3.56      3.36 3.00 0.36 1.27 0.10
Video
video conservative 2 6 2.90      aggressive conservative diff t p
3.56 2.80 0.66 1.48 0.08 *
text conservative 3 7 3.10      Text
aggressive conservative diff t p
text aggressive 4 8 3.17      3.17 3.10 0.07 0.18 0.43
diff t p
0.03 0.10 0.46
10
Earnings 
Increasing
Earnings 
decreasing
average aggressive conditions less average conservative 
3.44 3.67
9 6 average video aggressive less average video conservative
3.00 2.80
3.00 3.20 average text aggressive less average text conservative
9 10
3.33 3.00
9 4 average earnings increasing less average earnings decreasing
3.19 3.17
5
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Table 5: ANOVA Results: Az Individual (SDT accuracy) 
 
 
Notes:                    
A Least-squares means (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005).     
B ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
C ANOVA results are presented without two and three-way interactions, which were non-statistically significant, for clarity. 
ANCOVAs including all control variables (listed in Appendices M and N) were tested and do not change the significance of 
the results presented. All control variables were non-statistically significant. 
 
  
Dependent Variable Az individual (SDT Accuracy)
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 8 0.74 0.09 3.29 0.00 ***
Error 53 1.50 0.03
Corrected Total 61 2.24
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSEAz Mean
0.33 29.88 0.17 0.56
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
media format 1 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.89
disclosure tone 1 0.09 0.09 3.29 0.08 *
earnings condition 1 0.18 0.18 6.27 0.02 **
professional experience 5 0.47 0.09 3.32 0.01 **
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Table 6: Descriptive Data Az (SDT Accuracy) 
 
Notes:                    
A Mean values and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.     
B P-values are presented for one-tailed tests, ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
Panel A: least-squares means Accuracy Az Disclosure conditions (video versus text)
Increasing Decreasing average video all video aggressive video conservative
video earnings-
increasing
video earnings-
decreasing
Video aggressive 0.60 0.56 0.58 lsmeans 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.60 0.53
Video conservative 0.59 0.50 0.55 text all text aggressive text conservative text earnings-increasing text earnings-decreasing
Text conservative 0.55 0.47 0.51 lsmeans 0.56 0.60 0.51 0.63 0.48
Text aggressive 0.71 0.50 0.60 diff 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.05
prob t 0.42 0.37 0.28 0.32 0.25
average 0.61 0.51 Tone conditions (aggressive versus conservative)
aggressive all video aggressive text aggressive
earnings-incresing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
lsmeans 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.66 0.53
conservative all video conservative text conservative
earnings-increasing 
conservative
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
lsmeans 0.53 0.55 0.51 0.57 0.49
diff 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.04
prob t 0.09 * 0.33 0.08 * 0.07 * 0.26
Earnings conditions (increasing versus decreasing)
earnings-increasing video increasing text increasing
earnings-increasing 
aggressive
earnings-increasing 
conservative
lsmeans 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.57
earnings-decreasing video decreasing text decreasing
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
lsmeans 0.51 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.49
diff 0.11 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.09
prob t 0.01 ** 0.16 0.02 *** 0.04 ** 0.12
119 
 
Table 6, continued: Descriptive Data: Az (SDT Accuracy) 
 
Notes:                    
A Least-squares means and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.     
B P-values are presented for one-tailed tests, ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.  
  
Increasing Decreasing average video all video aggressive video conservative
video earnings-
increasing
video earnings-
decreasing
Video aggressive 0.58 0.55 0.56 lsmeans 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.51
Video conservative 0.60 0.48 0.54 text all text aggressive text conservative text earnings-increasing text earnings-decreasing
Text conservative 0.53 0.56 0.55 lsmeans 0.58 0.62 0.55 0.62 0.54
Text aggressive 0.71 0.53 0.62 diff -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.03
prob t 0.38 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.23
average 0.61 0.53 Tone conditions (aggressive versus conservative)
aggressive all video aggressive text aggressive
earnings-incresing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
lsmeans 0.59 0.56 0.62 0.64 0.54
conservative all video conservative text conservative
earnings-increasing 
conservative
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
lsmeans 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.52
diff 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.02
prob t 0.32 0.24 0.03 ** 0.40 0.50
Earnings conditions (increasing versus decreasing)
lsmeans earnings-increasing video increasing text increasing
earnings-increasing 
aggressive
earnings-increasing 
conservative
0.61 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.57
lsmeans earnings-decreasing video decreasing text decreasing
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
diff 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.52
prob t 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.05
0.50 0.40 0.39 0.32 0.46
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Table 7: ANOVA Results: Ca (SDT criterion) 
 
 
Notes:                    
A Least-squares means (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005).     
B ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
C ANOVA results are presented without two and three-way interactions, which were non-statistically significant, for clarity. 
ANCOVAs including all control variables (listed in Appendices M and N) were tested and do not change the significance of 
the results presented. All control variables were non-statistically significant. 
  
Dependent Variable Ca (SDT Criterion)
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 8 1.09 0.14 2.12 0.05 *
Error 51 3.26 0.06
Corrected Total 59 4.34
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSECa Mean
0.25 163.05 0.25 0.16
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
media format 1 0.40 0.40 6.19 0.02 **
disclosure tone 1 0.02 0.02 0.36 0.55
earnings condition 1 0.03 0.03 0.45 0.50
professional experience 5 0.71 0.14 2.23 0.07 *
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Table 8: Descriptive Data: Ca (SDT criterion) 
 
Notes:                    
A Least-squares means (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005) and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.    
B P-values are presented for one-tailed tests, ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively.  
Disclosure conditions (video versus text)
Earnings-
increasing
Earnings-
decreasing average video all video-aggressive video-conservative
video earnings-
increasing
video earnings-
decreasing
video-aggressive 20% 23% 22% lsmeans 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.20
9 7 text all text-aggressive text-conservative text earnings-increasing text earnings-decreasing
video-conservative 31% 16% 24% lsmeans 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.06
5 9 diff 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.14
text-conservative 2% 13% 8% prob t 0.01 *** 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 0.01 ** 0.10
9 10 Tone conditions (aggressive versus conservative)
text-aggressive 10% -2% 4% aggressive all video-aggressive text-aggressive
earnings-incresing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
9 4 lsmeans 0.13 0.22 0.04 0.15 0.11
conservative all
video-
conservative
text-conservative
earnings-increasing 
conservative
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
average 16% 13% lsmeans 0.16 0.24 0.08 0.17 0.15
diff -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
0.35 0.43 0.33 0.39 0.48
Earnings conditions (increasing versus decreasing)
earnings-increasing
video earnings-
increasing
text earnings-
increasing
earnings-increasing 
aggressive
earnings-increasing 
conservative
lsmeans 0.16 0.26 0.06 0.15 0.17
earnings-decreasing
video earnings-
decreasing
text earnings-
decreasing
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
lsmeans 0.13 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.15
diff 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02
prob t 0.33 0.28 0.49 0.43 0.45
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Table 9: ANOVA Results: PC (Non-SDT accuracy) 
 
Notes:                    
A Least-squares means (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005).     
B  ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
C ANOVA results are presented without two and three-way interactions, to allow for comparability to Tables 5 and 7 and prior 
research. Investigation of the results for PC is beyond the scope of this dissertation. ANCOVAs including all control variables 
(listed in Appendices M and N) were tested and the results presented above do not reflect those results, as there are differences 
in statistical significance and statistically significant control variables omitted from this Table. ANCOVA results for PC are 
available upon request. 
  
Dependent Variable: PC (Non-SDT accuracy)
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Value Pr > F
Model 8 0.19 0.02 1.72 0.11
Error 53 0.73 0.01
Corrected Total 61 0.92
R-Square Coeff Var Root MSE Az Mean
0.21 19.07 0.12 0.61
Source DF Type III SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
media format 1 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.42
disclosure tone 1 0.02 0.02 1.15 0.29
earnings condition 1 0.04 0.04 3.00 0.09 *
professional experience 5 0.12 0.01 1.82 0.13
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Table 10: Descriptive Data: PC (Non-SDT accuracy) 
 
Notes:                    
A Mean values and t/p are two sample t-tests assuming unequal variances.     
B P-values are presented for one-tailed tests; ***, **, * are indications of statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
Disclosure conditions (video versus text)
average video all video-aggressive
video 
conservative
video earnings-
increasing
video earnings-
decreasing
video-aggressive 62% lsmeans 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.61
text all text-aggressive text-conservative text earnings-increasing
text earnings-
decreasing
video conservative 65% lsmeans 0.61 0.65 0.57 0.63 0.58
diff 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.02
text-conservative 57% prob t 0.20 0.24 0.05 ** 0.28 0.27
Tone conditions (aggressive versus conservative)
text-aggressive 65% aggressive all video-aggressive text-aggressive
earnings-incresing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
lsmeans 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.61
conservative all video conservative text-conservative
earnings-increasing 
conservative
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
lsmeans 0.61 0.65 0.57 0.64 0.58
diff 0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.02 0.04
prob t 0.18 0.05 ** 0.27 0.22 0.11
Earnings conditions (increasing versus decreasing)
lsmeans earnings-increasing
video earnings-
increasing
text earnings-
increasing
earnings-increasing 
aggressive
earnings-increasing 
conservative
0.65 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.64
lsmeans earnings-decreasing
video earnings-
decreasing
text earnings-
decreasing
earnings-decreasing 
aggressive
earnings-decreasing 
conservative
diff 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.58
prob t 0.04 ** 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.19
9 7
earings-
increasing
earnings-
decreasing
61% 63%
71% 59%
5 10
57% 57%
9 10
70% 60%
9 5
64.7% 59.6%
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Table 11: Az Individual Least-squares Means and Contrasts by Experience  
  
Group Az LSMean
1 0.55
2 0.62
3 0.64
4 0.62
5 0.73
6 0.32
Panel B: Least-squares Mean Contrasts for Az: Group by Experience
Group
i/j 1 2 3 4
1
2 0.91
3 0.99 1.00
4 0.99 1.00 1.00
5 0.29 0.89 0.99 0.95
9+ years
prefer not to answer
H0:LSMean1=LSMean2
Internship
1 - 2 years
3 - 4 years
5 - 8 years
125 
 
Index of Figures 
Figure 1: Financial Statement User Decision-making Model 
Figure 2: Simple Signal Detection Theory 2x2 Matrix  
Figure 3: Theories of Communication Media Format 
Figure 4: Experimental Predictions by Hypothesis  
Figure 5: Signal Detection Theory: Measures, Surrogates, and Theoretical Constructs (Ramsay 
and Tubbs, 2005) 
Figure 6: ROC Curve (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005)  
Figure 7: Experimental Design 
 
  
126 
 
Figure 1: Financial Statement User Decision-making Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model has been adapted from Maines and McDaniel (2000) and Clements and Wolfe (1997) with social factors (Pijanowski, 
2009) and emotions contributing to the decision process (Lowenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch, 2001).
Media format for presenting 
disclosure 
No information weighting 
possible, therefore, no 
implication on decision 
Social, cognitive and cultural mediating 
factors may affect every decision step 
(e.g., financial statement user learning 
type, investment experience, training) 
 
Weighting of the 
information 
Was information acquired? 
No information evaluation 
possible 
Was the information evaluated? 
Financial statement user Decision 
Yes (signal) or No (noise) 
Emotions and risk 
based decision 
interaction  
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
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Figure 2: Simple Signal Detection Theory 2x2 Matrix*  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Sprinkle and Tubbs (1998); Ramsay and Tubbs (2005) 
  
Stimulus
Hit Miss
False Alarm Correct Rejection
Response
Yes - Missated No - Not Misstated
Signal - Misstated
Noise - Not Misstated
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Figure 3: Theories of Communication Media Format  
Panel A: Theory of Media Richness+ 
Media Format* Information Richness 
Face-to-face Highest 
  
Telephone High 
  
Written personal (email, letters, 
memos) 
Moderate 
  
Written formal (bulletins, documents) Low 
  
Numeric formal (computer output) Lowest 
 
+ Daft and Lengel (1984) 
 
 
Panel B: Theory of Media Naturalness # 
 
Media Format* Information Richness 
Super virtual reality 
 
Video financial reporting 
 
Face-to-face 
Less 
 
Moderate 
 
Highest 
  
Video conferencing High 
  
Telephone Moderate 
  
Written personal Less 
  
Written formal Least 
 
# Kock (2004, 2005) places face-to-face communication at the center of his model. For purposes 
of this study, I exclude a discussion of super virtual reality. I modify the Information Medium 
category names to be similar to each other for the purpose of this figure. 
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Figure 4: Experimental Predictions by Hypothesis 
 
H1: Participants in the video media-format condition will be less accurate in detecting misstated accounts than those in the text media-format condition. 
H2a: Participants in the conservative-tone condition will be less accurate in detecting misstated accounts than those in the aggressive-tone condition. 
H2b: Participants in the video conservative-tone condition will be less accurate in detecting misstated accounts than those in the text conservative-tone condition. 
H2c: Participants in the video aggressive-tone condition will be more accurate in detecting misstatements than those in the text aggressive-tone condition.  
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Figure 4, continued: Experimental Predictions by Hypothesis 
 
H3a: Participants in the earnings-decreasing condition will be less accurate in detecting misstated accounts than those in the earnings-increasing condition. 
H3b: Participants in the earnings-decreasing condition will exhibit smaller differences in the percentage of misstatements detected between the earnings release 
format conditions (video or text) than the earnings-increasing condition. 
H4a: Participants in the video condition will have a larger criterion value (less extreme confidence) for their account assessments than those in the text condition. 
H4b: Participants in the aggressive-tone condition will have a smaller criterion value (more extreme confidence) for their account assessments than those in the 
conservative-tone condition. 
H4c: Participants in the earnings-increasing condition will have a smaller criterion value (more extreme confidence) for their account assessments than those in 
the earnings-decreasing condition. 
Hypothesis 3a Hypothesis 3b
Earnings Condition
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blue -increasing
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Figure 5: Signal Detection Theory: Measures, Surrogates, and Theoretical Constructs   
(Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005) 
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Figure 6: ROC Curve (Ramsay and Tubbs, 2005) 
 
The first observation is the one closest to the origin, corresponds to the hit rate of .30, and the 
false alarm rate of .10 that would occur if the participant responds the balance is misstated only 
when categorized as definitely or almost definitely misstated. The second observation 
corresponds to a hit rate of .60 and the false alarm rate of .40 that would occur if the participant 
responds misstatement whenever categorized as definitely or almost definitely misstated and 
probably misstated, but responds not misstated whenever categorized as possibly misstated, 
probably not misstated, or definitely or almost definitely not misstated.  
Ca is interpretable as a conservative/liberal index that is associated with four values for each 
participant in each treatment condition and is calculated in standard deviation units between the 
minor diagonal in an ROC graph and each estimated point on the ROC curve. The minor 
diagonal is the dotted line, at which the hit rate equals the rate of correct rejections (no bias, 1 
minus false alarm rate). Points below the minor diagonal (positive values) happen when the hit 
rate is smaller than the rate of correct rejections. 
 
False Alarm Rate P(Yes|Noise) 
____________________ 
0 = empirical points from rating task. 
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Figure 7: Experimental Design 
Panel A:  
Seven-point Likert Scale for Participants’ Confidence in Their Account Assessment 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
definitely 
misstated 
almost 
definitely 
misstated 
probably 
misstated 
possibly 
misstated 
probably 
not 
misstated 
almost 
definitely 
not 
misstated 
definitely 
not 
misstated 
 
 
Panel B: 
2x4 Between-subjects Signal Detection Theory Matrix 
 
H= Hit, M = Miss, FA = False Alarm, CR = Correct Rejection 
H M H M
FA CR FA CR
H M H M
FA CR FA CR
H M H M
FA CR FA CR
H M H M
FA CR FA CR
Format 
Condition
Earnings Increasing Earnings decreasing
Aggressive 
Video
Conservative 
Text
Conservative 
Video
Aggressive Text
Misstatement 
Condition
